

***THE
RESURRECTION
TO CONDEMNATION***

***Robert Roberts' Answer
to the Pamphlet Entitled
"The Blood Of The Covenant"
by J.J. Andrew of London, England.***

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P R E F A C E

PROBABLY the best preface will be the following extract from a letter just received from brother Lake, of the London ecclesia:—

"I am glad to hear that you are preparing a reply to the pamphlet, 'The Blood of the Covenant.' You have probably heard of the severe conflict into which the meeting at Barnsbury Hall has been plunged by this question. The matter has been developed in this way: Our basis of fellowship states, in proposition 5: 'That resurrection affects those only who are *responsible to God by a knowledge of His revealed will.*' This clearly conveyed and was interpreted by all, including brother Andrew, to mean the responsibility of enlightened rejectors of the truth."

"About three years ago, however, brother Andrew suddenly adopted his present views. We had known for years of *some* who held similar views, but the question was thought to be an out-of-the-way one, having little bearing upon any vital matter, and there was a tacit agreement not to strive about it. This attitude is maintained by many, including myself, to be the right one, even now."

"Brother Andrew would not, after his change of opinion, accept this position. He commenced to introduce the matter into lectures and addresses, with much denunciation of the doctrine in the basis as 'error,' &c. This was the beginning of strife. He subsequently gave notice of a proposition involving his new principle, which created much controversy, and the sense of the meeting being strongly against it, was ultimately withdrawn."

"But although knowing that these views were opposed to our basis and to the minds of the brethren, brother Andrew still pressed them upon every possible occasion—converting all our meetings into a scene of contradiction and dissension; and of late saying that those who taught that resurrection was possible by the power of God only and outside of the blood of Christ, were 'blasphemers,' 'held a fatal error,' and were 'liars.' This made action necessary. Repeated private remonstrances having been made without avail, notice was given to bring the matter under the notice of the ecclesia in an official manner. In order that the subject and the action taken should be fully understood, a series of meetings were arranged for an exhibition of the evidence upon the question. The last of these was held on Sunday last. Next Sunday, another meeting is to be held at which a motion will be made, re-affirming the truth as defined in the basis."

"I thought it best you should be in possession of these facts."

***"You can make use of this letter in any way you may think fit, although I have sent it as a private communication."

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THE RESURRECTION TO CONDEMNATION :

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTORY

It is with no pleasure that I write an answer to the pamphlet that has just been published by brother J. J. Andrew, of London, entitled, "The Blood of the Covenant." The personal respect in which I hold him; the number of good things the pamphlet contains; the advantage given to the enemies of the truth by conflict among its friends; and the discouragement and distress that must necessarily be caused to many who are waiting for Christ by the flood of mystifying technicalities let loose upon them from quarters where edification ought to be looked for—all combine to render the task most unacceptable and painful.

However, it cannot be avoided. I have striven to stave it off by every means in my power. Twelve months ago, I went up to London to see brother Andrew with reference to a proposition of which he had given notice to the London ecclesia, which would have compelled the brethren there, on pain of disfellowship, to adopt the views he now advocates. I succeeded in inducing him to withdraw that notice on my undertaking to answer the arguments he had written out *in extenso* in advocacy of his new views. I wrote my answer, and afterwards answered many written questions which he addressed to me. In the end, he withdrew his written argument, not, however, as a paper that had been refuted, but as one that did not "adequately" sustain his views, and which he must re-write, as Dr. Thomas re-wrote *Elpis Israel* before it was printed. The pamphlet now published is the said argument re-written—in substance, the same, but modified in many respects in harmony with the criticisms to which it had been subjected.

CHAPTER II—CHANGE OF FRONT

In the preface to the pamphlet, brother Andrew suggests, and almost says, that the new pamphlet is but an amplification of his previous publications, and that the new doctrine is the mere elucidation of principles previously enunciated. This is called "a new departure." It is the result of a change of view. In *Jesus Christ and Him Crucified*, pages 115 and 148 (*the Paper Edition* for 1877—the only one at hand), brother Andrew teaches the doctrine which he now opposes, and more than one ecclesia has adopted the statement of faith drawn up by him, in which it is stated that resurrection is for those "who are responsible to God *by a knowledge of His revealed will*," and that "*all these, whether just or unjust, faithful or unfaithful, will be raised from the dead at the second appearing of Jesus Christ.*" The new pamphlet is written, therefore, not to "supply a deficiency" (as he expresses it), but to overthrow a position deliberately taken in previous publications. Whereas, beforetime, he believed and taught that men, knowing that God addresses them in the gospel summons to "repent," refuse compliance at the peril of a resurrection to condemnation, now he maintains that rebels against the light can keep clear of resurrectional consequences by keeping clear of the waters of baptism; that only those who choose to make some endeavour to obey God by submitting to the name of Christ in the way appointed can become the objects of Divine vengeance in the day of judgment.

It is well to have the issue clearly before us, and this is the actual position of the case nakedly stated, though these are not the terms in which the new pamphlet puts it forward.

CHAPTER III—LITERARY PECULIARITIES

The pamphlet is not correctly named. It implies that those against whom it is directed dispute the efficacy of the blood of Christ: it ought to be called *Unbaptised Rebels not Resurrectionable to Punishment*. This would define the pith of the contention spread over sixty pages of closely-printed matter.

The pamphlet is well written, and incidentally advances much that is precious in God's neglected truth, but I have no hesitation in asserting that notwithstanding its apparent colloquial frankness (carried to the extreme of mannerism, especially in the later parts of the work), it is characterised in many places by fallacy of reasoning of the subtlest character, which only long experience would enable the reader to detect. The arguments are neat enough in most cases, but it is often the neatness of verbal jingle merely. The writer ensnares himself in mere phrases which are often figurative, and which he uses as if they had a literal meaning. Words are adjusted rather than meanings, with the effect often of mystifying the mind instead of enlightening it. There is a time for figure and periphrasis certainly, but it is not the time for such when literal meanings are in question. Technicalities become mere ambiguities when the question in controversy is the meaning expressed by the technicality. The whole argument, in fact, is too mechanical. The relation of God as a living being to the living creatures He has made is concealed behind an apparatus of law which is discussed as a lawyer would discuss the mechanical and soulless operations of Gentile law. It creates the felling of being in the presence of a soulless machine instead of a living God of kindness and wisdom.

CHAPTER IV—FIGURES OF SPEECH

The very title has this effect: "The Blood of Christ: ITS efficacy in baptism, &c." Relatively, the blood of Christ has a commanding place in the system of God's righteousness, but it is not according to wisdom to speak of it as if it were a literal agent in developing the results associated with it. When the saints are said to be "washed from their sins in Christ's own blood," it means that God has forgiven them because of their submission to the declaration of his righteousness in the sacrificial death of His son. It does not mean that they have been touched with his literal blood as the congregation was touched with the blood of slain animals. They have not been in contact with his literal blood. They could not be brought into contact with it. The blood spilt on Calvary dried up within a few hours of its exudation from the wound made by the Roman spear: and if it could have been gathered up and treasured in a phial, it would have been of no advantage to a mortal man possessing it, though it might have been treasured by superstition or worshipped by benighted Roman Catholics. To say that "Jesus Christ was raised by his own blood" is to speak truth mistily, on an occasion when it requires to be spoken very plainly. The statement of Paul that Christ was "brought again from the dead through the blood of the everlasting covenant" is free from the mist pervading this pamphlet. We have only to ask who brought Christ from the dead to see the difference. It was the Father who brought him from the dead. His blood did not raise him. The shedding of his blood was a conspicuous part of his obedience, and therefore prominent in the cause that led God to raise him. But the operative force was the will-power of God. The pamphlet speaks throughout as if the blood of Christ was the actually and literally efficient magical cause or talismanic substance which automatically worked out its results wherever brought into contact: like a chemical force or transmuting electrical energy. Such a meaning would be repudiated of course,

yet the force of many of the arguments arises from such a use of the term. It unpleasantly savours of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the real presence, and of the orthodox extravagances in which we were all brought up, e.g.: —

There is a fountain filled with blood,
Drawn from Emanuel's veins,
And sinners plunged beneath that flood
Lose all their guilty stains.

In the definition and demonstration of literal principles, it is well to avoid technicalities, however appropriate these may be in the right place, and to speak in the language of literal precision. If the pamphlet did this, it would never be able even to seem to make a reasonable show of argument on behalf of the idea that God will only punish such as try to obey Him, and leave untouched those who refuse to do so. By its mechanical method it would be possible to establish the greatest absurdities. It would be apparently possible to prove that no salvation is possible now at all. Such a syllogism as this could be maintained:—

Contact with the blood of Christ is necessary to salvation.
Contact with the blood of Christ is impossible in the present age,
because there is no blood of Christ anywhere.

Ergo,

Salvation is impossible.

As a matter of terms, this proposition is unassailable. It is when we go behind the terms and find out the meanings, that we discover its fallacy. It is so with many of the arguments of the pamphlet. Verbally, they appear conclusive. On a correct definition of terms, they vanish. This I hope to show in the review following.

CHAPTER V—A PONDEROUS EFFORT

It challenges notice as an unfavourable circumstance that where a single affirmative testimony would substantiate the simple proposition that no one will be raised from the dead who has not been baptised, it is thought necessary in the writer's estimation to travel through the whole range of divine procedure from Eden to Calvary, and re-discuss and re-cast first principles which have been established and settled for forty years. This of itself is proof that there is something unnatural in the argument. Its great length and wordy elaborateness are inconsistent with the supposition that the conclusion aimed at is a matter of simple truth. These features are also suggestive of the great strength of a position which it requires such an enormous leverage to move.

CHAPTER VI—NEW DOCTRINES

But how greatly is misgiving excited when it is discovered that the writer is compelled to make important changes in scriptural principles in detail in order to reconcile things to his new view. Thus the sentence of death is no longer "Dust thou art and unto dust shall thou return," but "immediate death, which would necessarily be death by slaying" (page 6, line 14), a violent death (page 7, line 8), and, as a matter of fact, that "Adam did not suffer the violent death which he incurred" (page 25, line 28), and therefore the Edenic penalty was not carried out either on Adam or his descendants, although in other directions, the writer contends so stoutly for the inflexibility of divine law. Then we have the doctrine that the reason of the sentence of death not having

been carried out was the justifying power of the sacrifice of animals, notwithstanding the apostolic declaration that they cannot take away sin, and that the law of Moses had no power to justify (Heb. 10:4; Acts 13:39). We have also a new doctrine of the "second death." In *Jesus Christ and him crucified*—The writer scripturally wrote: "To all who will be the subjects of the resurrection of damnation, it will be *the second time they have been deprived of life*. It is therefore appropriately termed *the second death*. But between the two deaths, there will be this great difference. The former will in most cases have been *a natural death, such as is common to all mankind* generally, whereas the latter will be a violent death, preceded by intense mental and physical suffering."

But this is what we now read: "The death incurred by Adam and inflicted on Christ being a violent death, it necessarily follows that Christ. . . suffered the first death in its most acute form. When, therefore, believers are baptised into that death (the death of Christ), they die in symbol the *first death*. . . No one can die the second death unless justified from the offence which brought the first death."

The change here is from "natural death common to all mankind" as the first death, to the death of Christ as being the first death, and so giving ground for the contention that none but those in Christ can die the second death.

We have also the new idea that Abraham was justified, not by believing the promises that God made to him, as Moses and Paul allege (Gen. 15:6; Rom. 4:3), but by believing also that the inheritance "required the taking away of sin by bloodshedding," of which Moses and Paul say nothing, except to intimate, in the case of Paul, that that part of the wisdom of God was unrevealed (Gal. 3:23).

There are other divergencies from long established principles, but these are sufficient to give special point to the writer's own remark on page 58: "The truth is so perfect, and each part is so interwoven with the rest that it is impossible for error to be affiliated to one item without others being affected."

CHAPTER VII—THE DOCTRINE ASSAILED

Before noticing the writer's arguments in detail, let us consider for a moment the doctrine assailed. This may be defined in the following scripture-attested propositions:

- I. *That ignorance excludes men from accountability, but that they are responsible to divine judgment at the resurrection when they know the demand that God makes upon them by Christ and the apostles, whether they submit to it or not.*

PROOF—"Men that have no understanding are like the beast that perish" (Psa. 49:20).

"The times of this IGNORANCE God winked at" (Acts 17:30).

"This is the (ground of) condemnation that light is come" (John 3:19).

"If ye were blind, ye should have no sin" (John 9:41).

"To him that KNOWETH to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (James 4:17).

"He that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not" (Matt. 7:26).

"Who KNOWING the judgment of God, that those who do such things

are worthy of death" (Rom. 1:32).

"He that believeth not (the Gospel preached to him) shall be condemned" (Mark 16:16).

"The servant that KNEW his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes...for to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required" (Luke 12:47).

"I received mercy because I did it IGNORANTLY" (I Tim. 1:13).

"He that REJECTETH me, and RECEIVETH NOT my word, the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day" (Jo. 12:48).

"Whosoever will not hearken to my words which he (Jesus) shall speak in my name, I will require it of him" (Deut. 18:19).

- II. That the scriptures recognise and teach it as according to righteousness and justice that those who rebel against the light should be brought to punishment, even though they be "without or outside"

PROOF—"We are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth against them that commit such things. After thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thy self wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" (Rom. 2:2,5).

"Whoremongers and adulterers God will judge" (Heb. 13:4).

"Them that are without, God judgeth" (I Cor. 5:13).

"Because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon THE CHILDREN OF DISOBEDIENCE" (Eph. 5:6).

"We were by nature the children of wrath EVEN AS OTHERS" (Eph. 2:3).

"Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men" (II Cor. 5:11). This is connected with the judgment seat of the previous verse.

"Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.

"I say unto you that every idle word men shall speak, he shall give account thereof in the day of judgment" (Matt. 12:32,36).

"Whoso shall offend one of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he were drowned in the depths of the sea. Woe unto the world because of offences...Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh...It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire" (Matt. 18:6-8).

"He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John 3:36).

"The unbelieving...shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death" (Rev. 21:8).

- III. That responsible men are to be punished at the resurrection BECAUSE THEY ARE WORTHY OR DESERVING OF IT, and not because of any technical compliance on their part with the divine institutions.

PROOF—"Of how much sorer punishment suppose ye, shall he be thought WORTHY, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God" (Heb. 10:29).

"They who commit such things are WORTHY of death" (Rom. 1:32).

"He that knew not and did commit things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with few stripes" (Luke 12:48).

"How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation" (Heb. 2:3).
"Depart from me, ye that work iniquity" (Matt. 7:23).
"If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the wicked appear?" (I Pet. 4:18).
"They that have done evil (shall come forth) to the resurrection of condemnation" (John 5:29).

IV. That the multitude who shall appear before the judgment seat of Christ will be composed, not only of the faithful and unfaithful members of his own immediate household (who are but a comparatively recent development of the divine principles that have been operative in the earth for 6000 years), but of all who have refused to submit to the law of God when reasonably attested.

PROOF—"He (to whom the Gospel in its apostolic presentation) that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark 16:16).

"To them that perish... (the apostolic message), a savour of death unto death" (II Cor. 2:15,16).

"Those mine enemies who WOULD NOT that I should reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me" (this is in addition to the servants entrusted with the talents) Luke 19:27).

"The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all godliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness, ... God shall render to every man according to his deeds—to them that are contentious and do not obey the truth but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish... in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Christ Jesus, according to my Gospel" (Rom. 2:18; 2:6,8,9).

"Taking vengeance on them that know not God (that is, are not acquainted with Him in the sense of submission) and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ" (II Thess. 1:8).

CHAPTER VIII—THE THEORY ADVOCATED

The conclusion aimed at in the writing of the pamphlet is a negative one, and can be expressed in few words, viz., that men who knowingly rebel against the authority of God will not be raised for punishment unless they have been baptised. But the argument by which it is sought to establish this proposition is both very extensive and very diffuse. It is spread over a large surface. It is not definitely formulated in any part of the pamphlet. It is only to be gathered from a long dissertation drawn out into over 32 sections. In this scattered form, the large employment of unproved assertion and the subtle interweaving of words used without a definite meaning is liable to produce an effect not attributable to just reasoning, but to the mere process of dogmatic reiteration.

When the various elements of the argument are collected and analysed, they will be found to be not only inconclusive but positively destructive of each other. We shall briefly show this here before proceeding to an examination of the argument in detail.

The first postulate is that when God gives a law, "He limits His own action to that which is specified therein... However much His laws may be broken by others, they are not broken while in operation by Himself." The object of this, as the starting point of the argument against the non-resurrection of wilful rebels against the light, is to prove in the upshot that their resurrection would be

impossible because they are under a sentence of death which has never been revoked. God's "limitation of action" to the course prescribed under His own law would exclude it: so reasons the pamphlet.

Very well, does the pamphlet adhere to this principle in the working out of its own conclusions? On the contrary, it upsets it as soon as it sets it up. On page 1, it contends that God will and must carry out His own laws. On page 2 and elsewhere (e.g. page 6, line 14), it teaches that the Edenic law was that Adam should die violently on *the very day* that he ate of the forbidden tree; and on page 3, that the Edenic transgressors were informed on the very day of their transgression that "they *should not suffer* immediate death," and that as a matter of fact (page 25) "Adam *did not suffer* the violent death which he incurred."

Here is the very first postulate of the writer's argument overthrown by himself, and that too before he quits the garden of Eden: "Adam," he says (page 8, line 17), "was threatened with *death on the day that he sinned*; but God, *by an exercise of mercy*, provided an animal on which was inflicted the literal death incurred by Adam." That is, God did not do that which the writer had just contended He was obliged to do, on his theory of the matter. "As the supreme law-maker, He is also the perfect law-keeper." He made law, "in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," by which the writer contends he meant that Adam should die "a sudden death" within the 24 hours of his transgression; and the law that He made, He did not carry it out. "His laws," says the writer, "may be broken by others, they are not broken while in operation by Himself." Yet here is a law in actual operation—only just given—and here it is, on the writer's theory of it, "broken by Himself." The suggestion is that, "by an exercise of mercy," He refrained from doing that which in the law laid down He said He would do. If it be said He did not refrain from doing it; but "he provided an animal on which was inflicted the literal death incurred," the answer is that this was not in the law laid down. The law was that ADAM should die. It was not carrying out that law to make an animal die instead. The writer's own postulate is that in giving a law God "limits His own action *to that which is specified therein*" (page 2, line 3). That which was specified in the Eden law was the death of Adam. The death of an animal was not specified. Therefore, by the writer's own principle, he was excluded from this modification of the action of the law. His argument about enlightened rebels is that they "must remain in the grave when they die," because God "limits His action" towards them to "that which is specified" in the Adamic sentence under which they were born. If his argument is sound, then Adam must have died a sudden death on the very day of transgression, because God's principle when He gives a conditional law, "is to limit His own action to that which is specified therein."

But the writer suggests as an explanation that "the exercise of mercy" came in: that is, the principle of "limiting His action" to what He threatened was not acted on, but another principle was brought to bear which prevented this limitation, and which prevented Adam from dying the death he ought to have died according to the law of the case. Without asking whether this was really the case (which we utterly deny as a suggestion inconsistent with the revealed principle of divine action), we have to ask, if mercy released Adam from the penalty of the Edenic law, what reason there is for the outcry against the possibility of its relaxation in the case of enlightened rebels of Adam's descendants who sin against the light? The pamphlet contends that these cannot re-awake to punishment because the sentence of Adam is on them, while it teaches that Adam himself escaped the penalty of the law by reason of certain other considerations overriding divine law. If considerations of mercy could set aside the claims of

the Eden law in the case of Adam, why are those claims to be such a barrier to the claims of justice at the resurrection?

There are several other inconsistencies in the argument. The great contention of the pamphlet throughout is that the Edenic law has come into force through Adam with such inexorable effect that God dare not in harmony with His own methods relax it for a moment in the case of enlightened rebels, who deserve that coming forth to the resurrection of condemnation which Jesus says awaits those who love the darkness rather than the light. Yet in the case of Adam himself, we are taught that the Edenic law was not carried out. "Adam did not suffer the violent death which he incurred." Where are we then? Why, that death has not entered the world by Adam. It was about entering but was averted in the very crisis of the transgression "inflicted on the animals slain." If it was diverted from Adam to the animals slain, was it not equally diverted from his descendants? There is nothing but confusion at every step.

Then there comes along with this, the new doctrine that the sacrifice of animals was efficacious for the removing of Death. The writer plainly says that "the men of the ante-diluvian age called on the name of the Lord in *the offering of sacrifice*, and *THEREBY were justified from sin*," thus going in the face of the explicit declaration of the apostles, that "it was not possible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sin" (Heb. 10:4). The writer suggests in connection with the case of Enoch, that "the sacrifice of Christ was prospectively applied to him in connection with those sacrifices, just as that sacrifice is now retrospectively applied to those who are baptised into the name of Jesus Christ." There must be something radically unsound in a theory that involves such a violation of apostolic teaching, which declares that "the way into the (anti-typical) holiest of all *was not yet made manifest*, while the first tabernacle was yet standing," and that the gifts and sacrifices of the patriarchal and Mosaic age "could not make him that did the service perfect as pertaining to the conscience," consisting as they did of "carnal ordinances imposed on them *until the time of reformation*." "Before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should *afterwards be revealed*" (Gal. 3:23). "We were children in bondage under the elements of the world" (4:3).

But according to the new theory, the sacrifice of Christ was as efficacious in the times of the law as in the times of the gospel. If so, "the way into the holiest of all" was made manifest; Enoch, according to the pamphlet's construction of it, entered into it. And not only so, but the writer says, "It would have been quite consistent with Edenic law if God had likewise translated *all others* who were *justified by a sacrifice for sin* and an approved walk." This only shows how seriously the stress of his false argument against the doctrine of responsibility by light has wrenched the fastenings of the whole system of revealed knowledge which he has so acceptably sustained for many years.

CHAPTER IX—THE GROUND OF RESPONSIBILITY

The propositions contained in chapter VIII., with the passages appended to them, demonstrate the doctrine concisely expressed by Dr. Thomas, in par. 46 of *The Revealed Mystery*, in these words: "Those who have come to an understanding of the gospel but have rejected it...come forth from the grave again to encounter the burning indignation of Christ, the Judge of the living and the dead, at his appearing and his Kingdom."

There has been no particular need for insisting upon this doctrine in the efforts that have been made to diffuse a knowledge of the truth in our generation, on

account of the general tendency of the popular mind to go to an extreme on the subject of the punishment of the wicked. The necessity has rather been to point out that the popular doctrine of the responsibility of every human being was inconsistent with the Bible limitation of responsibility to those who come into knowing contact with divine law. The arguments against this extreme have been directed to show that both scripture and reason are against the holding of men responsible who are ignorant or incapable, who cannot be punished upon any recognisable principle of justice, and who cannot be saved in harmony with the gospel requirements of enlightened submission.

But like every other human effort, the argument in this direction has been carried too far in some quarters. It has been applied with the result of denying that any responsibility exists for those who become acquainted with divine truth, provided they do not become incorporated with the name of Christ in obedience of the truth in baptism. This is the extreme now formally adopted and advocated in the pamphlet now under review. The argument in support of it is as ingenious as it is elaborate, but it is palpably illogical, and would lead to confusing results in unexpected directions, as I shall now try to show.

The first thing to be noticed is the unnatural association of the blood of Christ with condemnation. The central idea of the blood of Christ, as bearing upon man, is reconciliation and protection, as shown by the phrase "reconciled to God by the death of His Son," and "the blood of sprinkling" on the door posts of the Israelites in Egypt which saved them from the destroyer. To put forward the blood of Christ as the ground of resurrectional condemnation is to clash with this central idea. A man cannot be saved unless he is reconciled, but he does not require to be reconciled in order to be the subject of retributive judgment. This is shown by the fact that the judgment of God has been manifest against mankind where no reconciliation existed, and precisely because there was none. In this respect the view assailed in the pamphlet stands in a very different position. It is capable of concise scriptural formulation as in the passages quoted in chapter VIII.

The real question at issue is *the ground of responsibility*. The weakness of the new position is manifest when any attempt is made to define this. This attempt is too elaborate for quotation, but when the author of the pamphlet was asked to define it in few words, his answer was that the ground of responsibility was "deliverance from Adamic death." Asked if he could cite any brief scriptural definition to that effect, he admitted that he could not, but said the sense had to be gathered from various teachings of the Word.

There must be the ground of responsibility where the existence of sin is recognised "Sin is not imputed when there is no law" (Rom. 5:13), but the whole world is recognised as being in this condition: "The world lieth in wickedness," "God hath concluded all under sin," Paul says; and also, "All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."

Yet though all have sinned, all are not held responsible, and the reason is plainly alleged—because light and knowledge have not been universal. In such circumstances God "winks at" wickedness. This is Paul's declaration: "The times of this *ignorance* God winked at." This "winking at" implies the existence of the thing to be winked at; which is sin, which has wages over and above "Adamic death."

Why is there to be resurrection to condemnation in any case? The question can be answered in Bible language. It is because the subjects of it are "thought worthy" of condemnation. This is the essence of the operation. It is the very expression

of the Spirit of God, as occurred in the passages quoted. This supplies a rule for deciding the position of the man who knows the will of God and refuses to submit to it. If he is not "worthy of punishment," on what ground are the unfaithful worthy of punishment? For is it not the essence of their case, that they "know the Lord's will and do it not"? Paul in substance affirms this principle when he asks the question, "How shall we escape *if we neglect* so great salvation?" (Heb. 2:3); and Peter, "If judgment begin at us, what shall the end be of *those that obey not* the gospel of God?" (I Pet. 4:17). Here is an extension to those who do not submit to the gospel, of the judgment applicable to those who do. All these expressions convey the idea of *moral desert* as the ground or reason of resurrection to condemnation.

It is objected by some that this is to appeal to men's fears instead of their understanding and love. The answer is obvious. The appeal to fear as well as to love is in harmony with the complex constitution of human nature, and with the custom of the Spirit of God in the scriptures, as well as with the bearing of the conditions of the universe upon created being.

Paul recognised "the terror of the Lord" as involved in his approaches to men with the gospel. If the notion that there is no danger to those who refuse to submit were correct, there would be no terror in it. A man would simply have to decide not to be baptised to be effectually screened from the consequences of rebellion. Though fear is not the ruling motive appealed to, it is a motive appealed to all through the scriptures; and it is according to "nature itself" that it should be appealed to. It has on all men an influential part in the determination of action. We have got away from the orthodox hell; but we must not get away from "the wrath of God revealed from Heaven" against all unrighteousness of men. This we should do if we were to hold that the wilfully disobedient escape responsibility by making their disobedience sufficiently thorough.

CHAPTER X—THE NEW ARGUMENT

Briefly stated, the new argument is that men cannot rise from the dead unless the Adamic sentence is taken away; that the Adamic sentence is taken away in the case of those who are baptised into Christ, and in the case of those under the law who submitted to circumcision and sacrifice, and that, therefore, they can rise to judgment because they are not under the Adamic sentence: that it is not taken away in the case of those who have had no contact with actual or typical atonement, as the phraseology of the paper runs; therefore, argues the writer, they cannot rise.

Let us look at this argument. We shall find that it is not only unfounded but involves a number of strange anomalies unsuspected by those who may think the argument plausible.

First of all, it conflicts with the fact that resurrection has already taken place in recorded cases where there could be no question of atonement, of which the son of the widow of Zarephath may be taken as a type. These cases are disposed of by calling them "mere miracles," but this does not dispose of them at all; they are a direct confutation of the contention that resurrection *cannot take place* where the Adamic sentence is operative, for in all the cases referred to, that sentence had not been interfered with in any way, typically or otherwise, yet God raised them for his own purpose. This shows the Adamic sentence is no bar to God raising the Adamicallly-sentenced dead, if He have any reason for doing so.

If Elijah could raise an Adamicallly-sentenced human being as "a mere miracle," to

show the power of God, obviously Christ can do the same at his coming if there are those among that class whom he shall consider worthy of punishment, under the operation of the justice of God. The proof is absolute, that the presence of the Adamic sentence is no bar to the resurrection to condemnation, if condemnation is deserved.

The writer argues that if the law of sin and death (which for his purpose he contends is the sentence of death in Adam) "is not interfered with by superior law (meaning another law into connection with which the sentenced person has come), "death without the possibility of resurrection is the portion of those who are under it." We prefer to say, "If not interfered with by God." There can be no doubt that unless God saw cause for interference there would be no resurrection at all to anyone. It is His interference alone that ends the dominion of death either for good or evil. His law in the case is not automatic. Christ would never have risen if God had not raised him. The righteous would never rise if Christ did not raise them. It requires divine volition to apply divine law, and "in all His ways" those volitions are governed by righteousness and justice. That men professing the truth should ever be at issue on such an elementary fact is amazing.

It is a matter of revelation that God will interfere with the dominion of death over the dead: "There shall be a resurrection *both of the just and of the unjust.*" And the reason for the resurrection is given, "That they may receive according to that they have done." It is wholly a question of moral desert, and not of mechanical law. To argue as if the "law of the spirit of life" were a new mechanical principle which automatically delivers men from the grave, is to confuse our thoughts on the subject.

CHAPTER XI--BACK TO EDEN

The writer goes back to Eden to get a beginning to his argument. And in making this beginning, he reminds us of arguments which we used to have to encounter at the hands of orthodox friends in the beginning of our conflicts on behalf of the truth. He insists that the death prescribed by the law of Eden for Adam's disobedience was death actual on the very day. Adam and Eve were to "die suddenly" on the day of transgression. "Dying thou shalt die is a Hebrew idiom," and does not mean a process, because we read in the same chapter of "eating thou shalt eat." What are we to say? Is not eating a process? Who can eat an apple without first raising the fruit to his mouth, then biting, then chewing and then swallowing, and then the thing is eaten? And is not dying a process in ordinary circumstances? Whatever the process may be, the man is not dead until the process is complete. It is certain he is not dead so long as he is living, and that "dying thou shalt die" is a description of a process, and not the fiat of "sudden death." But it is "a Hebrew idiom." True: but it is an idiom in accord with literal truth which is *not always* the character of the idioms of other languages.

But we need not trouble about the idioms. The meaning of the threatened penalty is not left to our construction of an idiom. It is defined with precision in the terms of the sentence actually passed. "Dust thou art, and *unto dust shalt thou return.*" Here is no "sudden death," but the very process of "dying thou shalt die," which the writer demurs to on the score of idiomship.

Then if a sentence of sudden death was the threatened penalty of transgression, as Adam and Eve did not die suddenly, the sentence was not carried out, and Adam and Eve were not brought under "the law of sin and death,"—though the writer's strenuous contention is that God is so bound by any law He lays down that He dare

not depart from it; and also that the impossibility of unbaptised persons rising from the dead lies in the fact that the sentence of Adam has not been taken away from them. Adam did not suffer the sentence, but they must, though they did not sin the sin which brought it on Adam—not to be carried out on him, but to be transmitted to them. Confusion! Confusion!

The writer sees in the sacrifice provided immediately after transgression, "an atonement or covering for sin," by which the penalty of death incurred by transgression was averted. This is more extraordinary still. If the sentence of death was averted from Adam by sacrifice, was it not averted from all in him? How came it then to be transmitted to his descendants? It *has* been transmitted, for this is the very ground of the writer's contention against the resurrection of the unjustified, namely, that the transmitted sentence of death in Adam makes their resurrection impossible.

CHAPTER XII—TYPES AND SHADOWS

The attempted answer to this difficulty is that the sentence was removed typically. What is the meaning of this? If it was removed, whether typically or actually, it was removed; if it was not removed, it was not removed. If it was removed, how can it pass to posterity? If it was not removed, how could Adam be free from it? The self-stultification involved in the argument is indicative of the unsoundness of the position which it is employed to maintain. It is a complete mistake. The sentence has been removed in Christ alone; and all sacrifices and other ceremonies were merely matters of provisional discipline, preparing men for and pointing forward to him, but having no actual present effect except as securing the favour of God by compliance with his requirements.

Adam and Eve died symbolically, says the writer, when the animals slain for their atonement died, and died literally "when in accordance with the Edenic sentence they subsequently returned to the dust." Here is confusion again. If the sentence required them to die suddenly, their returning to dust afterwards was not in accordance with the sentence, and if the sentence, whether symbolically or actually, were removed by the death of animals, they ought not to have died at all.

But the fact is the sentence was not in any way affected by the sacrifice of animals in Eden. It remained as much on Adam and Eve afterwards as before, and has come from them to all their descendants to this day. God is in the process of removing it in harmony with the moral principles involved, and will at last abolish it altogether from the earth, but until it is taken away, it is not only taken away in Christ, and prospectively for all those whom he may ultimately select to share in his deliverance therefrom.

The writer seems to see this, for under this head he says, "The atonement in Eden and all subsequent atonements down to the time of John were of course typical." But this does not get rid of the dilemma. What is meant by the atonement being typical? Typical is not real, and if not real, it has no effect, unless something else is done to which the typical performance has foreshadowing reference. The fact is, these typical performances were what might be called ritual prophecies, which God required to be performed as an act of submission to Him, leading to his future favour in the matter to which the performance pointed.

But, says the writer, "The principles of atonement in type and anti-type are the same, namely, the covering of sin." This is not clear writing. The covering of sin is a figure of speech after the order of God's promise that He would "cast all their sins behind His back;" literally, the casting of sin behind His back, is

forgiving it—letting the sinners go—agreeing to act as if there were no sins. If it is with this meaning that the writer speaks of a covering of sin, what does he mean by saying, "The principles of atonement in type and anti-type are *the same*"? Is forgiveness of sin the principle referred to? If so, what is the difference between typical and anti-typical atonement? It is evident from this mode of treatment there is none, and if there is no difference, why is there such a thing as typical, as distinguished from real atonement? Let the difference be defined, and the argument will be delivered from cloud. The type is but a pre-figuring of something to be done; it is not the doing of that thing, and if so, —if the death and resurrection of Christ were the actual mode of the removal of the Adamic sentence, then that sentence was not removed from Adam and Eve through the offering of sacrifices, and the first postulate of the writer's argument is gone.

CHAPTER XIII—ALLEGED TEMPORARY EFFICACIES

He does not save his argument by saying that the difference between typical and anti-typical atonement is the durability of results. He says, "The typical is only of temporary efficacy, whereas the anti-typical is permanent." This may be neat as a matter of words, but it means nothing to the purpose. What can it mean? Does it mean that under typical atonement, God forgives sin for a certain time, and then allows it to come into force again? Does it mean that the Edenic sentence of death was taken away when these sacrificial animals were slain, and then put on again at some later time? This would be "temporary efficacy," and if this is the meaning, it would be necessary to point out when the sentence came into force again, and we should then have to face this conclusion, that whenever it came into force again, it would operate as much as a bar to the resurrection of Adam or anyone else, as the writer contends it operates in the case of rejectors, upon whom the intended effect of the argument is to fasten the sentence so inexorably that under no circumstances could they be revived from death as mortal men for punishment, however deserving of the wrath of God they might be.

The writer says, "The sin of Adam has been transmitted in the nature of his descendants." This is not denied or doubted when the sense is correctly defined; but how can it be maintained consistently with the argument that sin was taken away by an atonement of "temporary efficacy?" If it was taken away, it could not be transmitted, and if it was transmitted it was not taken away. Therefore, the attempt to attach a redeeming value to "typical atonement" is a failure.

Besides, why should the typical atonement be limited to one part of the penalty of disobedience, and not extend to all? Adam was not only sentenced to death, but he was driven out of Eden, and doomed to a life of toil, and the ground was cursed for his sake. If the argument about "temporary efficacy" were true, Adam ought to have been taken back temporarily into the Garden, and released from toil, and the curse not inflicted upon the ground. The argument is self-stultifying at every step. The writer has to say, "that the law could not take away sin, because its atonements were only typical." If this is true of the typical atonements of the law, it would be true of the typical atonement of Eden. If so, that atonement did not take away sin, or remove the sentence of death, and therefore the argument which makes the removal of that sentence necessary to resurrection falls to the ground.

CHAPTER XIV—THE IMPORT OF CIRCUMCISION

The writer claims that circumcision was an atonement "for the sin inherited from Adam," "a ceremony which warded off premature death"—a view for which he finds evidence in the fact that if not circumcised, the man child should be "cut off

from his people." Against this conclusion we place a number of incontrovertible facts. First, God's own definition of the nature of circumcision, in Romans and in Genesis. Paul says (Rom. 4:2) that "Abraham received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had being yet uncircumcised." The language in Gen. 16:11, is this: "Ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you." Here are two descriptions: one, that it is the "seal of the righteousness that Abraham already had," and the other that it was "a token of the covenant" made upon the basis of this righteousness. Justification preceded it, for Paul says: "How was faith reckoned to Abraham for righteousness? when he was in circumcision or uncircumcision? Not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision" (Rom. 4:9,10). Justification and atonement are equivalent terms; hence the attempt to make circumcision an atoning or justifying rite, is inconsistent with the fact that Abraham was justified before circumcision. Circumcision was, in fact, what might be called a ceremonial recognition or ratification of the faith in Abraham which pleased God, and a token for all time of the covenant which God entered into with him on the basis thereof.

That God should employ for such a purpose a ceremony prefiguring the actual method for carrying out the covenant in Christ was fitting and is beautiful, but to argue that it did that which Christ alone could do, is to perpetrate a glaring fallacy.

It is an *evident* fallacy, for if circumcision were "an atonement for Adamic sin," no circumcised Israelite could have died under the Adamic sentence of death, which they did in scores and thousands in childhood, as other nations. There is no difference between Jewish and Gentile children in this respect; not only so, but as girls could not be circumcised, they could not come under this atonement, and we should have the extraordinary idea that while all Jewish boys were delivered from the Adamic sentence of death, all Jewish girls continued under it.

And if circumcision were "a ceremony which warded off premature death," it is impossible to understand why it should interfere with faith in Christ. We read in Gal. 5:6, "Behold I Paul say unto you that if ye be circumcised—(if ye have premature death warded off, *according to the argument*), CHRIST SHALL PROFIT YOU NOTHING." We can understand this if circumcision was "nothing" but the keeping of a command (I Cor. 7:19) like other similar commands of the law "imposed until the time of reformation" (Heb. 9:10). Men trusting to circumcision for a justification which was only available in Christ would naturally have no benefit from Christ in the matter. But if it conferred a little justification, and Christ was to confer the rest, the ground of Paul's declaration is not obvious.

The argument the writer draws from the circumcision of the sons of Moses long after date, operates in the reverse sense to his own contention, for had the Adamic sentence required "sudden death," and circumcision were its appointed antidote, the children of Moses ought not to have lived long enough to have been brought to Moses by their mother. The fact is as Paul says: "Circumcision is *nothing*, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the Commandments of God." That is to say, there is no virtue in the matter, one way or other, except as God requires circumcision for his own purpose. The nature of that purpose we have already looked at. The commandment of God had been disregarded while Moses was in the wilderness of Midian, and even after God had appeared to him at the flaming bush. This was the cause of God's anger, and not that the Adamic sentence required circumcision to prevent sudden death.

Even supposing the writer's contention were correct (that circumcision removed the Edenic sentence) its ultimate application to resurrection is excluded by Paul's

declaration that circumcision is *made uncircumcision* by the breaking of the law. According to this declaration, a breaker of the law was in the same position as if he had been uncircumcised (Rom. 2:25). If so, and if uncircumcision meant helpless subjection to the sentence of death in Adam, then all the Jews without exception were in that position, because every one of them without exception had broken the law. Where then is the distinction between Jew and Gentile which this pamphlet aims to set up as regards the possibility of resurrection? Paul asks: "Are we (Jews) better than they (the Gentiles)? *No, in no wise*, for we have before proved *both Jews and Gentiles* that they are ALL UNDER SIN" (Rom. 3:9).

The Jews laid great stress upon circumcision as the ground of their standing with God. This was reasonable since it was a divinely appointed token of the covenant between God and them, and that God had expressly declared that its omission would be fatal to their standing before Him. Their mistake was in supposing that this token of the covenant could avail them anything if they were disobedient to the will of God in other matters. Paul admitted that circumcision was "profitable" provided it were allied with that course and habit of obedience, as a part of which it had its whole acceptability. He meant to say that compliance with God's appointments under the law, beginning with circumcision, would make them eligible for the redemption that was to be wrought out in Christ, and that in this respect it would be profitable if they were obedient in faith. That he meant circumcision redeemed them from the Adamic sentence is a gratuitous suggestion. It was merely a part of the shadowy prophecy of how this was to be done. Literally, it was a mere seal of Abraham's righteousness, and a token of God's covenant. Ritually, it was a prefiguring of the principle upon which God will accept men under the new covenant, namely, the cutting off or repudiation of sin as the rule of human life. This is as far as the Scripture goes in the matter, and to go further is not only to be wise above that which is written, but to make void that which is written. Circumcision had its antitype in Christ; our sinful body was crucified in him, and in our baptism, we figuratively take part in that process, in token of the fact that we accept death to sin, and resurrection to righteousness as the form and mode of our new life before God in hope. It is in fact the ritual adumbration of the moral principle upon which the salvation of sinners is to be effected, but the argument of this pamphlet makes it a thing having "sacramental virtue," as the phrase is, freeing a man from a sentence that has not been taken away except in Christ.

CHAPTER XV—INCONSISTENCIES

There are many of these throughout the pamphlet. An extraordinary feature becomes apparent. The admission that circumcision, "although an atonement for Adamic sin, was made void by subsequent transgression," is an illustration, when taken in connection with the contention that this atonement opened the way for resurrection. If "atonement for Adamic sin" was "made void by disobedience," then disobedient Israelites were again put under Adamic condemnation, and as this was the case with all Israel absolutely, how are we to understand the resurrection of any of them to judgment consistently with the writer's contention that the presence of Adamic condemnation is a bar to resurrection? The writer admits the resurrection of just and unjust Jews, as he is bound to do. He admits this, notwithstanding the fact that all of them are in the grip of the Adamic sentence in spite of circumcision, because of its having been made void by subsequent transgression.

In their case it appears they can come forth from the grave, notwithstanding that sentence. If so, why is the presence of that sentence to be so fatal in the case of enlightened rejectors who have not come in contact with any atonement? If disobedient Israelites, whose atonement had been made void, can come forth to

resurrection of condemnation, because they deserve to come forth, why should the Adamic sentence be such a bar to the resurrection of enlightened rejectors, if they also in the divine estimation deserve to come forth?

So also in the case of the passover, which has been contended for by the same writer, though not in this pamphlet, as "an atonement for Adamic sin only." This of course means release from Adamic sentence, or else means nothing. If the passover released from Adamic sentence, why should it be repeated every year? This yearly repetition is used by Paul as one of the arguments against the efficacy of sacrifices and offerings under the law. If the atonement contended for is not release from the Adamic sentence, then by the passover atonement the Adamic sentence is not released, and the argument has no bearing upon the question of removing the barrier to resurrection. This view of the passover is without foundation. The passover must be taken as sufficiently explained by God's own explanation, namely, that it was required by him as a protection against the destroying angel, of whose vengeance the Israelites were as much deserving as the Egyptians; and secondly, that its yearly observance was a yearly bringing to remembrance of Israel's deliverance out of Egypt.

That while serving these purposes, it was also a figure of the redemption to be wrought out in Christ is beautiful, but does not give to it the efficacy claimed for it. It was not "release from Adamic sin," but the ceremonial enforcement of God's supremacy, which Israel were called upon to recognise as the condition of the mercy shown to them as his people. If the argument of the writer could be maintained, it would detract from the value and need for the sacrifice of Christ, since it would teach that an atonement was achieved by the passover which was only achieved in him.

CHAPTER XVI—DIVINE CLAIMS AND HUMAN RECOGNITIONS

Judgment has been described by the same writer as "an act of condescension by God to those who have in some way *recognised His claims*." This suggests that the validity of God's claims depends upon their recognition by men. This is an extraordinary suggestion. The claims of God exist, whether man recognise them or not. He is "the God of the spirits of all flesh," as Moses says. He himself says by Ezekiel, "All souls are mine." Frequently in the Psalms is the whole world commanded to stand in awe of Him. The idea that His claims will not be enforced where men do not "recognise" them is at variance with the most elementary principle of godliness. That there are circumstances in which they are not to be enforced is to be admitted, but we protest against human recognition as supplying that circumstance. This would confuse all notions of the relations subsisting between God and man. God is just, and does not enforce His claims where they are not known, but to say that He will not enforce them where they are known but not "recognised" is a violation of reason and scripture testimony, as already shown.

So, when the same writer speaks of "servants who have undertaken a certain Divine work," we object to the word "undertaken," as implying a liberty that does not exist if God command. Man has no choice when God speaks; he may refuse, but with consequences. This is Paul's exact language in Hebrews: "See that ye *refuse not* him that speaketh. If they escaped not who refused him that spake on earth, much more shall not we escape if we turn away from Him that speaketh from heaven" (Heb. 12:25). The ground of condemnation is refusal where the demand is known; whereas the words referred to suggest that "consenting" is the ground of condemnation. Claims and the undertaking of obligations are too different things. The revelation of the gospel is that God's claims exist, whether men recognise them or not, and that they will be enforced, quite irrespective of their consent or non-consent,

though with different degrees of punishment, according to the extent of knowledge. I dissent altogether from the proposition that man's obligation to obey God arises from man's consent. Man belongs to God, and although in Adam, when ignorant, he passes away like the beasts that perish, yet, when God speaks to him, he is bound to obey. This principle is not affected by the fact that there are those who, in a special relation, become "servants," "stewards," "sons," and other figurative relationships expressed by parable. To speak of the acceptance of these positions making it "fitting that the conduct of those accepting them should be tested by judicial ordeal," is too mild altogether to define the terrible obligation which the word of God creates. God is great and dreadful and terrible, as described by Daniel. It is not only a fearful thing to fall into His hands, but it is a fearful thing to slight Him in any way, although the world, long accustomed to His forbearance, has come to be insensible to such a consideration. "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof," and He will not be mocked in His claims, as is revealed, and as "nature itself" would teach us.

"Such considerations," remarks the writer, "are not to be found in those alienated from God" (that is, the consideration of "fitness that their conduct should be tested"). Such faintness and timidity of language fills me with surprise when used in the assertion of God's claims on those who rebel against him. "Such considerations are not to be found." What considerations? That they do not "undertake," they do not "consent," they do not "accept." What have sinners to do with "undertaking," "consenting," "accepting," when God speaks to them? Submission only is their part. "Duty" is too mild a word to express the obligation. In their refusal, they will be hurled from His presence in anger in due time.

I am surprised most of all at a remark that "they ('those alienated from God') have no claim to the privilege of the judgment seat." As the case in question is the case of rejectors only, this means they have no claim to "the privilege of condemnation!" What an extraordinary application of the term privilege!" It is a privilege the rejectors would be glad to dispense with. The paper says, "God has a perfect right to punish them, and blot them out of existence, without the intervention of any judicial ceremony," as if punishing them by judicial ceremony were a favour. If God have a right to punish them thus, has he not also a right to bring them again from the dead, if his justice require it? We cannot imagine an answer in the negative. He has already exercised this right of bringing unjustified Gentiles again from the dead when his purpose required it, and there is therefore no conceivable difficulty in the way of his again exercising this prerogative where his justice requires it. Enoch's definition of the principle of judgment has no reference to atonement, but to wickedness only. "The Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment upon all, and to convince *all that are ungodly* among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him." The argument of the paper would stultify this declaration. It would teach that where the ungodly are securely locked in their coffins by the Adamic sentence, God cannot unlock the coffin to award the punishment they deserve. It puts God in the helpless position of a Mede or a Persian, who cannot get rid of the entanglements of his own arrangements.

CHAPTER XVII—THE JEWS AND THE RESURRECTION

The author of the pamphlet finds it necessary to make artificial distinctions among the Jews under the law in order to make room for his new theory of responsibility. He says they were all "in the Mosaic covenant, but they were not all in the Abrahamic." He asserts this, but, as is the case with much in the pamphlet, he offers no proof, but rests the proposition on bare assertion. It is

a proposition that he cannot prove. It is a proposition contrary to the fact. That the Jews were in the Mosaic covenant there is no need to prove. It is a matter of sorrowful surprise that it should be necessary to prove that they were in the Abrahamic covenant as well, though they did not fulfil its requirements in cultivating the believing and obedient disposition of Abraham.

What was the Abrahamic covenant? Let this quotation suffice: "I will make my covenant between me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly ...I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee *in their generations* for an everlasting covenant to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee...Ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a *token of the covenant betwixt me and you*..."

The uncircumcised manchild whose flesh and his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; *he hath broken my covenant.*" The words quoted were spoken long before the covenant of Sinai. Thus a Jew could break the covenant made with Abraham; which he could not do if he were not in it. The Mosaic covenant was "added," as Paul declares (Gal. 3:17), for specific objects. It did not blot out the covenant God had made with Abraham and all his seed who should conform to its requirements. It imposed additional obligations, but did not supersede that which went before. All Jews were "in it," in the sense of being under it, or embraced in its obligations, or bound under penalties to conform to its conditions; and though all Jews were not the "children of Abraham" in the sense of resembling him in character, they were all the seed of Abraham in the sense of being his descendants, upon whom the claims of the covenant rested "throughout their generations" as Jesus recognises (John 8:37).

Peter expressly affirms their Abrahamic relation in his address to a Jewish audience in the precincts of the temple, as recorded in Acts 3:25. "Ye are the children of the prophets and of *the covenant which God made with our fathers*, saying unto ABRAHAM, And in thy seed, ect." Paul does the same thing in his address in the synagogue at Antioch: "Men and brethren, *children of the stock of Abraham*, and whosoever among you feareth God, to you is the word of this salvation sent" (Acts 13:20); and in his address before Agrippa, he recognizes that "unto the promise made of God unto our fathers, *our twelve tribes* instantly serving God day and night hope to come."

The writer seeks to justify his idea by reference to Paul's recognition of the existence of "Jews inwardly" in contrast to those who were Jews outwardly, which is a surprising argument, seeing that Paul was speaking of men, whether Jews or *Gentiles*, who were true Jews in inward state. He was not defining different classes of natural Jews. It is the exigency of a false theory, and that alone, that forces the author into these unnatural interpretations. He has to recognise that many of the Jews will rise from the dead and that many will not. Having discarded the scriptural explanation of that fact, namely, that the lack of understanding reduces a man to the level of a beast, and therefore makes him non-responsible (Psalm 49:20; Prov. 21:16), he has to devise one that will exclude enlightened rejectors of the truth of Gentile times. Therefore he invents the one expressed in the sentence at the head of this chapter: that "all Jews were in the Mosaic covenant, but they were not all in the Abrahamic." It is a distinction entirely foreign to the scriptures. It is a verbal distinction merely—a strife of words—like so many other things in this bewildering pamphlet. All Jews were absolutely in the same position so far as the institution to which they were related is concerned. They were all children of Abraham according to the flesh; they were all potentially related to the inheritance covenanted in the promises; they were all bound, on pain of God's displeasure, to conform to both the requirements of the Abrahamic covenant, and to those of the added covenant of Sinai. The

only difference was the difference of their individual conformities to these several requirements. This was not a difference to be expressed by the preposition "in" or any other verbal abstraction. It was a difference of character, of mental state, of moral attitude, and out of these differences towards the word God had spoken to them will arise the differences observed in God's further procedure towards them in the day of resurrection. This is all intelligible and reasonable; but this pamphlet would substitute legal and mechanical distinctions, which reduce the relations of God to man to an affair of machinery, instead of a matter of the highest discriminating intelligence and justice. It is bringing divine law to the level of the dead thing understood as law in a lawyer's office.

The new theory is an afterthought—the latest accommodation on the part of the author to the stress of criticism. He had said in the MS. paper preceding the printed pamphlet that the reason why certain Jews under the law would not rise from the dead was "that they never attained to a right apprehension of God's requirements." To this the answer was that if this were so, it implied that if they had so attained, justice would call for their resurrection, and that this was precisely how it was with the case of enlightened rejectors; of which he was endeavouring to get rid. They know the will of God, and do it not; and on the writer's own contention in the case of the Jews, must rise to answer for their wickedness. "The Jews in question," said the writer, "failed to perceive the ultimate principle of his requirements." Very well, but suppose they had not failed in this perception, but had been enlightened, the argument would require their resurrection, which was the very principle of responsibility by light, against which the writer is contending. "But," said he again, "the responsibility to the Mosaic law was obligatory." No doubt, but whence arose the obligatoriness? It may be answered, "Because they were under it." But what does this mean? What constitutes the "underness"? Is it not this, in literal language, that they were *bound to obey it because God had enjoined it on them*. Suppose, therefore, the Gentiles are enjoined to repent, and turn to God, and suppose they don't "fail to perceive" what is required; but, on the contrary, clearly understand, and yet refuse Him that speaketh from heaven, are they not in the very position supposed in the case of the Jews who might not fail to perceive the full requirements of the law?

Knowledge was clearly recognised under the law as making a great difference to sin. Sins of ignorance were discriminated from sins of presumption. It matters not that "its retributions were confined to this life"; the principle of retribution through knowledge is there, and God, who gave the law, intended resurrection-judgment for those with whom He was dealing under the law, as clearly shown by the New Testament revelation of the resurrection of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and the prophets. Solomon plainly declares it, that "God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil." Daniel shows the connection of this with the resurrection, in saying that among those who will awake from the dust of the earth, there will not only be those who will rise to everlasting life but those who will rise to shame and everlasting contempt. It is Paul's express declaration that there shall be a resurrection of the just and the unjust. The principle upon which this resurrection will take place must be operative in the present life. What is this principle? A most reasonable one; that God having spoken, if men submit, they will rise to everlasting life; that if they refuse to listen they will rise to condemnation. Whatever has power to rise to life eternal has power to raise to condemnation; therefore it is that Enoch, in his prophecy of the Lord's coming, speaks of the retribution then to be inflicted upon "all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against Him...murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts."

The only exemption from the operation of this rule is where ignorance or incapacity puts beyond the pale of judgment. This is reasonable. God's ways are "equal," which His is emphatic declaration several times repeated to Ezekiel, as against the imputations of Israel, and any interpretation that introduces inequality in His operations must be wrong.

It is to get rid of this argument that the artificial theory has been invented that some Jews were in Abraham and some were in Moses. The previous paper spoke of *faith* in the Edenic and Abrahamic promises opening the way for resurrection to life or condemnation, which is unobjectionable, if understood as *knowledge*. Faith does not condemn; it justifies. That which condemns is disobedience where there is knowledge. There never was any other principle in God's procedure towards man: the attempt to exclude it and to introduce the mere mechanical operation of law is an interference with the moral symmetry of the truth.

CHAPTER XVIII—THE LAW AND ETERNAL LIFE

The admission that the shedding of animal blood could not give eternal life is an admission that it could not take away Adamic death; and therefore a surrender of the contention that Adamic death was removed by Edenic sacrifice, by circumcision, the passover, etc. The fact is, the confirmation of the Abrahamic covenant by animal sacrifice was a typical performance purely; it was an enacted prophecy in figure to the effect that God would in His own way and time by Christ remove the impediment that lay in the way of the promised blessedness contained in the covenant. The distinction between typical foreshadowing and actual accomplishment is the answer to all the arguments based on what is called anti-typical atonement.

The law itself was nothing but a symbol or shadow throughout; it truly brought God's authority to bear for obedience, but it contained no power to deliver Israel from the sentence of death in which they were already held. It had only this power in the case of Christ, who yielded a perfect obedience, and abolished Adamic death by his own death and resurrection. The law was not intended to bring the Jews to Christ; (the statement to this effect in Gal. 3, "to lead us," is an italicised interpolation.) It was intended to fill up the time till Christ should be manifested and to prepare the moral situation for his appearing; it was a veil upon actual truth, through which the Jews could not see to the end contemplated, as represented by Moses putting a veil upon his face (2 Cor. 3:13-14).

It has been said by the author of the pamphlet that responsibility to Mosaic law was national and compulsory, while responsibility to the law of Christ was individual and voluntary. This is placing the law of Christ on a lower plane than the "word spoken by angels." Paul's argument is to the reverse effect. "If the word spoken by angels was steadfast, how shall we escape if we neglect the word spoken by the Lord?" "See that ye refuse not Him that speaketh from heaven." The sin of refusal implies the obligation to hear. This pamphlet denies the obligation unless the sinner undertakes to submit. This is a view foreign to the whole spirit of revelation, and to the dictates of common sense. Granted that if God "winked" at the state of ignorance, He imputes no responsibility to those who are ignorant, but, when He speaks and commands, it is at the peril of those who become aware of it if they refuse what He demands of them. Here lies the force of Paul's remark, "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men." It also imparts intelligibility to the fact that Felix trembled when Paul reasoned with him of judgment to come.

CHAPTER XIX—BAPTISM AND THE DEATH OF CHRIST

In handling this subject, there is a want of discrimination as to the bearings of different parts of the truth. It is true that the death and resurrection of Christ together form the anti-typical circumcision, as a cutting off or putting away of our present sinful body, but as yet the actual result is limited to Christ alone. Baptism is only a ceremonial identification with what was actually accomplished in him. It is required of us as a preliminary to sharing with him in the actual result achieved, but it is not correct to make this ceremonial and moral identification the actual identification itself. The whole work in its individual application is a process in stages, and is not complete until the final stage is reached. The man who believes but has not been baptised, is at the first stage; the man who has been baptised but has not worked out his salvation, is at the second stage; the man who has worked out his probation but dies, is at the third stage; but only when he is raised and changed into the nature of Christ is he the subject of the completed anti-type.

The forgiveness of sins at his baptism is only a part of the process. Morally and ceremonially partaking of the circumcision of Christ in baptism does not make a man free from the law of sin and death, except as regards the ultimate victory of that law; it is the beginning of the process of freedom, but it is in itself only a figure; or, as Paul describes it, "the *likeness* of his death, and the *likeness* of his resurrection." We must discriminate between likeness and reality. If baptism produced actual results, we should be immortal on emerging from the waters of baptism; whereas we are precisely as we were before, except that God regards us in the new relation of children, to which we have been introduced by adoption into Christ in the way prescribed.

We are not actually free from the operation of the law of sin and death until the body is redeemed from its power by change. Instead of saying that after men are thus redeemed, "it is impossible for the grave to hold them," the theory now put forward ought to say, "it is impossible for the grave to *receive* them," for this was the Adamic curse—to die. There ought to be no death to believers at all if we are redeemed from the law of sin and death by baptism. All the deliverance we receive at baptism is the preliminary legal absolution which requires ratification at the judgment seat of Christ for its effectuation. It is a process started at baptism, but not completed till death is abolished in the physical change that wipes it away.

It is therefore not correct to say that Gentile believers are made free from the Adamic sentence when they are baptised. They are but brought into the process of being made free. The freedom exists only in Christ as yet, and in him we possess it only as we possess eternal life. "He that hath the Son of God hath eternal life;" so he that hath the Son of God hath freedom from the law of sin and death—not actually, but in process of getting. Sinners belong to the grave, and to the grave only; if they are brought out of the grave, it is for punishment, because the judgment of God sees that justice requires them to re-appear to answer for slighted privileges. They are brought out for this purpose, not because they are free from death, as this pamphlet argues, but precisely because death has hold on them because of sin. What is true in this respect of baptismal rebels, is necessarily true of rebels who have still more rebelliously refused to be baptised. The ground of resurrectional responsibility is *slighted privilege*, and not consent to become responsible.

We demur to the idea that baptism is an anti-typical atonement: it is wholly a figure or likeness or type, as already pointed out. It is the ritual ceremony which God requires at our hands as a condition of our sharing the real anti-typical

atonement, which is in Christ, and Christ alone. We agree with the statement that those who are baptised into Christ are justified from sin, but demur to the answer given to the question of —*what sin?* That answer is, "the same sin that Christ was justified from by his death, which," the paper says, "was Adamic sin, for Christ had no other." This is in flagrant contradiction to the fact we are baptised for the remission of our personal sins. To use Peter's language, we are "purged from our old sins." The paper makes everything of Adamic sin, and apparently nothing of personal sin, thus inverting the natural order of these things in their importance. In the gospel presentation of the sacrifice of Christ, there is never any mention of Adamic sin; it is always the forgiveness of our personal sins that is put forward as the great privilege offered.

CHAPTER XX—THE MEMORIAL SUPPER

So with the symbols in the memorial supper: it is the sins of Christ's people that are conspicuously visible. He said, "This is my blood of the new covenant which is shed *for the remission of the sins of many*"—the many sins of his brethren. This is the essence of Paul's contrast between what has been accomplished in Christ, and what was done by Adam. "By one offence," he says, condemnation came upon many, but that the salvation in Christ is in the forgiveness of many offences unto justification. The preliminary paper contended that the supper "also reminds them that for sin committed *during probation*, they can obtain forgiveness." It is true that sins committed during baptism will be forgiven, but the sacrifice of Christ includes provision for the forgiveness of sins committed *before baptism*. It is the one feature standing in the front of the apostolic gospel proclamation. "Through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins." "He hath forgotten that he was purged from *his old sins*." We cannot account for the comparative absence (and in the first case, entire absence) of this feature, except by supposing that the exigencies of unscriptural argument required it. The moral relations between God and man are eclipsed by a legal theory that as it were forces God to hold sinners in the grave because of the sin of Adam, although their own sins would call for retribution on themselves.

So with the remark that "it (the supper) reminds them of something more; that, if unfaithful, they will be condemned when Christ comes." (This is to exclude the idea of condemnation for the unbaptised.) The paper finds proof of this idea in Paul's remark that "whosoever shall eat this bread unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." There is something very unsatisfactory in this application of Paul's words, for it would mean that to abstain from eating and drinking would be to escape from condemnation. It turns an ordinance intended to bring kindness to remembrance into one that threatens retribution—not to those who neglect it, but to those who attend to it. It excludes the great fact that it is evil doing that evokes the righteous judgment of God; that it is the works of the flesh which will receive His condemnation; that it is the unrighteous who shall not inherit the kingdom of God; that it is the fearful and unbelieving and abominable who are to be rejected. In fact, the broad moral features of the gospel are eclipsed by this lean and narrow construction.

The paper proceeds, "He who eats and drinks the bread and wine admits in so doing that he deserves to be cut off for his Adamic sin." We can only ask with surprise, "Did he not deserve to be cut off for his own sins?" There really seems to be an ignoring of personal sin altogether. In fact, it is the great flaw of the paper, a failure throughout to recognise the moral relations existing between God and man—the claims of the righteous possessor of heaven and earth to the worship and obedience of the creatures of the race He has formed in His own image, and permits to live upon the earth for His own purposes.

The paper proceeds, "He admits further that if he commits sin which remains unforgiven, He will deserve to be condemned at the judgment seat of Christ." This singular remark is supported by an argument more singular still; namely, by quoting Paul's remark that "He that eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh judgment unto himself if He discern not the Lord's body." The converse of these words of Paul would be that if a man discern the Lord's body in the act of breaking bread, he does not incur condemnation; but the argument of the paper is that he does. The writer has in fact been misled by a distant analogy of terms. Paul was warning the Corinthians against the penal results of sacrilegiously or ignorantly observing the breaking of bread, while the argument of this paper makes everything hang on the intelligent performance of it. He proceeds, "The symbols are thus designed to keep in remembrance not only loving mercy but also judgment and condemnation." The object of the remark is of course to confine the responsibility to those who break bread, but it must wholly fail in this purpose if it be shown that judgment and condemnation are otherwise and separately revealed, which they undoubtedly are; for Paul expressly declares the gospel to be a declaration of the judgment of God as well as of His kindness. Speaking of the gospel he says, "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." The Bible ground of condemnation is evil-doing where there is sufficient enlightenment to afford a just ground for judgment. The paper makes the ground of condemnation "consent to be judged for it," which is in opposition both to reason and scripture. His further remark that the twofold reminder of mercy and judgment "is provided for none but brethren of Christ" is contrary to the fact. The gospel is preached to the stranger as well as to the brethren, and the gospel is a revelation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness. It is a testimony against them as Jesus said, and this testimony is the ground of judgment. They would not be punished if there were no word preached, because justice would prohibit such a punishment, for it is a rule both with God and man to hold the ignorant irresponsible; but when they become aware that God has called upon them to repent and to turn to Him, it is only in harmony with the most elementary principles of reason and justice that they should become responsible. It is for this reason that the gospel is, as Paul alleges, "a savour of death unto death" where it is not "a savour of life unto life." No wonder that Felix trembled; but if he had had the matter presented to him in the form in which this paper presents it, he would have languidly toyed with the thing as a man to whom a voluntary membership in some society of doubtful advantage was proposed. "You shall have these advantages if you become a member, but mind, after you become a member, if you fail to perform the duties of membership, you will have to pay terrible penalties." We can imagine him considering it and saying, "I guess I won't become a member." We cannot imagine him trembling. The argument of the paper, though innocently intended, strikes us as a nullification and prostitution of the Word of God in its demand upon sinners. He is the God of the spirits of all flesh; every man upon earth belongs to Him; He has a right to their submission. The fact that He refrains from the assertion of this right where the conditions of responsibility do not exist does not mean that He can be mocked with impunity by those whose eyes are open. The paper lays it down that "those only have access to the seat of mercy who are amenable to the seat of judgment," and that the converse follows that "those only are amenable to the seat of judgment who have access to the seat of mercy." The truthfulness of this contention in the sense intended by the writer is disproved by the fact that the judgment of God has been inflicted upon sinners in times past where there was no "access to the seat of mercy," to employ the writer's phraseology. Even if the writer's contention were true, its logical working out would defeat his argument, for as the way to the mercy seat is open to all, the way would be clear for judgment to come forth upon all.

The pamphlet makes the same mistake in its construction of what Paul calls "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus," as with the question of our deliverance from "the law of sin and death." It ignores the process by which it is made finally effectual. It contends for "immediate effect," with this absurd result, that the author has to admit that those on whom the law of life is operative have to die; and those "who have not been freed from the law of sin and death" (which as he contends, imposed sudden and violent death), live on and die gently. There is no end to the absurdities of the new doctrine.

To say that those who have not been freed from Adamicallly-inherited death "must in the grave remain for ever" (the object of which is to exclude unbaptised rebels from condemnation), is to contradict the fact that many in that position have already emerged from the grave. To make the operation of the law of the spirit of life essential to resurrection to condemnation, is to violate common reason, as well as to outrage scripture teaching. The law of the spirit of life has reference only to the life eternal. The son of the widow of Zarephath was raised, not under the law of the spirit of life, but by the exercise of the power of God for His own purposes; so when the unfaithful are brought to judgment, it is not by the law of the spirit of life, but by the power of God committed to the hands of Christ to bring sinners again to life for punishment, if thought "worthy." Apart from their being *thought worthy of punishment*, there is no reason why sinners should be brought back to life at all, for the wages of sin is everywhere and always death, but God knows when moral desert calls for resuscitation from death to receive punishment.

The quotation from Rom. 8, "There is therefore now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus," is irrelevant to the question of whether enlightened rejectors of the truth are to rise. Taking it literally as it stands, it would teach either the non-resurrection of the unjust, or their non-rejection in the resurrection, for the unjust include many who are technically in Christ Jesus; and if there is to be no condemnation for those in that position, there would be none for them. The paper totally misapplies Paul's argument in this chapter.

The 8th chapter of Romans is chiefly directed to unfolding the moral principles that regulate the relations of man to God, of which the sentence of death in Adam is but the expression. Those principles existed before the sentence. The argument has its real starting point in the proposition of chapter 5, that "being justified by faith, we have peace with God," through the death and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The line of thought he proceeds to unfold is this: That while death came by one, life also is come by one, but with this difference, that the death through Adam came by one offence, whereas life through Christ comes in spite of, or prevails against a multitude of offences, which God forgives for Christ's sake.

The law, as he proceeds to say (chapter 5:20), which came after the entrance of death by Adam's one offence, was introduced expressly that offence generally might abound, so that God's kindness might have abundant scope in the forgiveness of many sins through Christ, "that as sin hath reigned unto death, so grace might reign through righteousness unto eternal life, through our Lord Jesus Christ:" upon which Paul anticipates the natural question,—If sin has had this beautiful effect of providing an arena for the operation of grace, would it not be well to continue in sin that grace might abound? The answer is an emphatic negative:—

How shall we that have died to sin with Christ in having been planted in the likeness of his death, continue any longer therein? Though we have only typically partaken of this death, in baptism, we are to reckon ourselves as dead really to the old law of sin which brings death, and alive to the new law which has been brought into force in Christ, to whom we are related.

The end of the things involved in the old law "is death," whereas by being free from sin, "there is fruit unto holiness, and the END everlasting life. It is the two ends that Paul is exhibiting—as the result of the two ways; death as the result of sin now followed, and life as the end of holiness now followed. The interpretation under review obscures this point by making Paul affirm a present result.

The very object of the law was to make the sinfulness of human nature quite apparent to every son of God and to all the world. "I was alive without the law once (thinking myself not a sinner), but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died." The law is not sin; on the contrary; it is holy, just, and good. "I had not even known sin but by the law." Its mission was to make sin manifest as exceedingly sinful, for without the law, sin was dead, and could not be apparent. "I, Paul, am naturally carnal, sold under sin; what I would not, that I do, what I would, I do not. *O wretched man that I am,*" where is my escape? "I Thank God for His deliverance, through our Lord Jesus Christ";—deliverance to come at "the end,"—not deliverance now, while I still carry the burden of this vile body, in which I groan, being burdened, but when Christ shall appear the second time, who has laid the basis for our forgiveness in eternal life, and through whom is preached unto us this forgiveness.

CHAPTER XXII—THE "NO-CONDEMNATION" OF ROMANS 8

"There is therefore now no condemnation" for us, —such as exists for sinners—namely, the ultimate and final condemnation that will destroy and cause to perish; for in, through, or by Christ, we are made free from the law which apart from him will condemn all sinners, and even us, *if we walk not after the spirit, but after the flesh.*

The Revised Version would omit the words "who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit." The structure of Paul's argument is against this alteration, which would obliterate that distinction between walking after the flesh and walking after the Spirit, which it is *the whole object of his argument to make apparent.* The identical phrase occurs in verse 4, with no suggestion of its being an interpolation; namely, that the righteousness of the law is "fulfilled in us *who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit.*" This is proof that the "we" and the "us" of Paul's discourse are limited to those who would walk after the Spirit, and further, that the statement that "there is no condemnation" is limited to such. All who are baptised do not walk after the Spirit, as we too well know; but, as he says to the Corinthians, "are carnal and walk as man." Of such his language is very express, in this very 8th chapter of Romans, verse 13, "If ye walk after the flesh *ye shall die;*" that is, ye who have been baptised; ye for whom, according to the argument of some, there is no condemnation.

It is an affair of mind Paul's argument is considering: the question of moral condition. As he says in verse 6—"To be carnally *minded* is death; but to be spiritually *minded* is life and peace;" and again, "As many as are *led by the Spirit of God,* they are the sons of God."

Paul is not discussing the relation of baptised persons to Christ irrespective of their moral condition, but precisely with respect to that condition. There is no

condemnation to them *if they walk after the Spirit*, because their sins are forgiven; they are purged from their old sins, and they are *heirs* of the freedom that has been wrought out in Christ; but as for such as walk after the flesh, there is nothing but condemnation, and that condemnation is a fact long before they come forth at the resurrection. The continuance of the privileged position to which the truth introduces them, is dependent upon their walking not after the flesh. If they do walk after the flesh, the condition of condemnation returns, and there is as much barrier to resurrection, according to the argument that excludes the resurrection of the enlightened rejector, as if they had never been baptised; for if condemnation on account of Adam's sin would keep them in the grave, certainly condemnation on account of their own sin would be no less powerful. The wages of sin is always death.

All this is spoiled by the contention that the "no condemnation" spoken of refers to "Adamic condemnation," and is a present actual freedom. If this is correct, baptism ought to cure our mortal nature, for our mortal nature is the one thing we have inherited from Adam, and the one thing that remains unchanged by the gospel. There is no change effected by the gospel except a change in our relation to God. Whereas before time we were alienated from Him by wicked words, we are now reconciled; whereas we were dead in trespasses and sins, our sins are now all forgiven, whereas we were children of wrath, we have become objects of His favour; whereas we were strangers and foreigners, we are now children. There is a present freedom, certainly, but not from the death inherited from Adam; for that will assuredly send us into the grave, if the Lord delay his coming, as if we had never heard of the gospel. The freedom we have, is freedom from our sins as obstacles to a future life, and from our alienship as an obstacle to future incorporation in the glorified house of God. With this Adam had nothing to do. From the death that came by Adam, we are being slowly delivered by a process that does not end till the change to the incorruptible. It begins when we hear the Gospel. It makes a step forward with baptism, but is not complete without that patient continuance in well-doing for which scope is afforded during the mortal life to follow; and even when that patient continuance in well-doing is finished, the process of deliverance still waits completion, for we go into the grave and would never more be heard of if we did not rise. Even when we rise, the process of deliverance requires the judgment seat to put on the finishing touch. To ignore this progressive nature of the process of deliverance must necessarily lead to confusion in all our interpretations.

It is the general law that sin leads to death. As Paul defines it at the end of chapter 6, "The wages of sin is death." We come under this law by being sinners, as he says, "while we were *yet sinners*, in due time Christ died for us." In such a state, death only is our portion. This is the law which Adam brought the world under. From this law we are made free by what has been established in Christ. But the "law of the spirit of life" is IN HIM. His obedience, death and resurrection established it as an ultimately operative force towards all of the human race whom he may approve. This law of the spirit of life came into force as the result of God's favour in giving us him, or, as Paul expresses it, "Grace hath reigned through righteousness by Jesus Christ unto eternal life." Christ's righteousness leading to Christ's resurrection and investiture with power to forgive sins, and raise the dead, has established IN HIM the law of the spirit of life, for all sinners who avail themselves of it in the way of God's appointment. But this law at present is in Him, and is not in us.

The freedom it has conferred upon us is only prospective as regards actual results. It is a very great freedom for present purposes, for it gives us hope and confidence and joy towards God, but the freedom is not actually conferred till the

resurrection. The change then to be effected is the consummation of what has been going on through the whole of life since the day the gospel was first heard. The law of the spirit of life in Christ makes us free from the law that would kill us if left to its own operation, but this law of the spirit of life requires Christ to exercise the power that God has given him for that purpose in the change of this mortal body which we inherit from Adam, and as the result of Adam's disobedience.

To say that Paul means that now, actually in this present life, the believer is made free from death in Adam, is to contradict the self-evident fact that the believer dies exactly as other men die, and must do so until he receives the change in that operation to which Paul refers further on in the chapter, to wit: "The redemption of our body" (verse 23).

The statement that "Christ has undergone condemnation for the sin inherited from Adam," is both too narrow and misstates the object of his death. It was not Christ that was condemned, but sin as represented by the nature that he possessed in common with us. His death by public execution was a public exhibition of what was due to man from God, or, as Paul expressed it, a declaration of His righteousness. It pleased Him to require this before inviting men to reconciliation through the man in whom this vindication took place. With that man He was "well pleased." "The Father loveth the Son."

The attempt to escape from the evident dilemma of saints dying by saying that "though freedom from condemnation does not prevent them from dying, it prevents them from dying in Adam," is a mere play upon words, for death has entered by Adam, and not by Christ, and it is in, by, or through Adam that all die, and the fact of our dying shows that we are still, so far as nature goes, connected with Adam. The connection is not terminated until the old Adam nature is abolished by the change to the new.

CHAPTER XXIII—THE TEMPORARY VICTORY OF DEATH

The new theory would require that death should not touch the friends of Christ. Yet the author of the pamphlet is obliged to recognise facts. The saints die as other men. How is this fact to be reconciled with the view that they are released from the claims of death at baptism? "Death," says the upholder of the theory, "is not to them the wages of sin." What is it the wages of, then? Does death come otherwise than by sin? Has not death come by the sin of Adam? It is a new doctrine that death can come in any other way, but it is not a true doctrine. Death has come by Adam, and by Adam alone. The saints are being delivered from it; but their deliverance is a process, and their probation a part of the process. The process is not complete till the glad day when they are able to ask the triumphant question, "O death, *where* is thy sting?" name *sin*, for "the sting of death is sin." "O grave, where is thy victory?" To sin, and sin alone, is the death of the saints due, tracing the cause back to its right origin, namely, Adam in Eden, by whom death came, which death is not destroyed till it disappears as the last enemy.

"On the other hand, their death does not interfere with the attainment of salvation." No, indeed, how could it? Death is that from which they are being saved by the process commencing with the knowledge of the gospel and ending with acceptance at the judgment seat. If they live to the coming of the Lord, they die not, because the time for their acceptance has arrived, but in this transient, limited and momentary phenomenon (*viz.* the fact that some do not die) the writer of the pamphlet sees "a practical illustration of the fact of being made free from

the law of sin and death." No doubt their immortalisation will free them from the law of sin and death, but if the contention in question (that they are actually free from that law when they are baptised) were correct, the effect would be seen long before the judgment-seat, for they would never die if released from the law of sin and death. But they do die, and this shows they are not actually released as yet, though in process of being released; and as it is in Adam that all die, the fact that they die shows that they are still in Adam, so far as their actual nature is concerned. Paul himself has been in the dust of death for 1000 years; if he was made free from the sentence, "Unto dust thou shalt return," why has he turned into dust? A theory so out of harmony with the undeniable facts of the case is self-condemned. Death is not a moral necessity for the justified in Christ, but as it is a physical law in the nature of saints because of their inheritance of that nature from Adam, it is an inevitable thing until the Lord remove it by change.

CHAPTER XXIV—A SET TIME FOR ACTUAL FREEDOM

The Lord Jesus as the Prince of Life has the power to abolish death and to unlock the gates of the grave, but until the time comes to use the key, the gates remain barred. Although they will not prevail against the saints, as a matter of fact they are closed upon them until the opening time.

So with regard to the hold of Adamic death upon believers in their present state: that hold remains until the time come for Christ to loose it. To say that the saints die "because they succumb to disease or accident before Christ come" is to skim over the subject. It does not touch the root of the thing. Is not disease of Adamic origin? Why succumb to disease if they are free from the law that causes it? The fact is, they are not free till the time for freedom comes. When the time comes, there will be no more curse and no more death; but until this, both prevail.

The process started by the gospel leads to this deliverance, but the wrong argument makes it achieve that deliverance at the beginning of the process. More extraordinary still is the admission that the saints "die as the consequence of Adam's sin, but not under the law of sin and death." This is a self-stultification of language. "The consequence of Adam's sin" comes from the operation of the law of sin and death, for that is the law of the case, that death comes by sin. The law of sin and death is, that death shall come from disobedience or sin; because of Adam's disobedience, death has come; death reigns over "*them who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.*" To this, Paul, although justified, was no exception. "Death worketh in us," "sentence of death in ourselves," "this body of death," and similar expressions indicate his recognition of the death state in which saints exist in their probation, although justified from their sins. To say, then, that "saints die in consequence of Adam's sin, but not under the law of sin and death," is a mere refinement of verbiage by which an untenable theory endeavours to keep up a show of consistency. It is to say that the consequence of the law of sin and death started by Adam's sin is not due to the law of sin and death.

Christ is the life of the saints; the life is therefore outside them as yet; the only thing actually in them is the sentence of death, the very phrase Paul uses, "the sentence of death in ourselves."

CHAPTER XXV—"THE BLOOD OF THE EVERLASTING COVENANT"

The writer quotes the statement of Paul that God "brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus Christ, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant," for the purpose of contending that there can be no waking from death at all except through blood-shedding. If he had contended that there could be no awakening from death *to live for ever* except through blood-shedding, the argument would have been scriptural, because this was the case with Christ, the example in question. That case yields no support at all to the idea that none can awake to mortal life to die again apart from the operation of "the blood of the everlasting covenant." Such an awakening is outside the operation of "the blood of the everlasting covenant." This is absolutely proved by the cases already referred to, where such an awakening has taken place without any relation to the blood of the everlasting covenant. What has taken place once can take place again. Jesus was not brought again from the dead that death might have dominion over him, but that he might have "length of days for ever and ever." His case has therefore no application to the resurrection of those who come forth to the resurrection of condemnation. No one can be brought again from the dead to die no more apart from the everlasting covenant. But to say that he cannot awake to die again unless that blood is sprinkled upon him, is to confound the character of that sprinkled blood. Even the typical blood sprinkling in Egypt on the door posts of the children of Israel tells us that its characteristic power is that of protecting and liberating and not of condemning and killing. That many upon whom that blood has been sprinkled will rise to condemnation, is not due to the fact of that blood sprinkling, but to the fact that they have proved themselves unworthy of the blood sprinkling by "doing evil." Men can rise again to mortal life without the blood sprinkling; this is absolutely undeniable; it is all a question of God requiring it. The exhibition of His power has required it in the past; the administration of His justice will require it in the future.

CHAPTER XXVI—THE REASON OF RESURRECTION TO PUNISHMENT

It is a matter of revelation that God will bring forth evil-doers as well as well-doers, the just as well as the unjust, the wicked as well as the righteous, sinners as well as saints, those who are to be cast into the lake of fire as well as those who are to come forth to life everlasting. It is desert that is at the bottom of it. Men are raised for punishment because they are "thought worthy of it." There is no other reason; this moral aspect of the case is not sufficiently prominent in the pamphlet. There is too much of mechanical law, and not enough recognition of the righteous judgment of God, "The wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men."

If God raise men to punishment who obey Him in baptism, but who afterwards fail to render *all the obedience he requires*, why should he not raise men to punishment who, having the gospel presented to them in its understood demands, yield *none of the obedience it requires*? There is an unutterable violation of moral consistency in the supposition that a partially obedient class should be raised, and the wholly disobedient class passed over. God expressly claims that His ways are equal or equitable or just (Ezek. 18:25-30; 33:7-20), that He is not a partial judge, that there is no iniquity in Him, just and right is He (Deut. 32:4). The doctrine that would make Him raise those who render a partial obedience, and leave unpunished those who deliberately perpetrate a complete disobedience for their own convenience, would be challenge of His character in this respect.

The argument of the pamphlet is conclusive against the entertaining of any hope of eternal life for man, apart from the sacrifice of Christ, but it has no force at all against the mere resuscitation of mortal sinners against God, if the justice of God require it; for while atonement, alias reconciliation, is essential to life eternal, it is not essential to condemnation. Reconciliation is the central idea of atonement or justification. To say that it is essential to condemnation is to utter a paradox. It is a contradiction in terms; reconciliation effectually carried out excludes condemnation.

CHAPTER XXVII—"IN CHRIST SHALL ALL BE MADE ALIVE"

This statement of Paul's in I Cor. 15:20-22, relates wholly to triumph over death by resurrection to immortality, which only those in Christ will attain, and therefore does not mean that a man must be in Christ before he can re-awake to mortal life to be judged and punished. That this is the case must be evident on a careful consideration of the terms of the statement: "*Now is Christ risen from the dead and become the first fruits of them that slept,*" that is, he is risen from the dead to die no more. Christ was "the first fruits of them that slept," in this sense; he was not the first fruits in the sense of having been the first to merely come out of the grave; for many others preceded him. "*For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead*"; that is, death came by Adam; life by Christ—not resumed mortal life but *everlasting life*. Resumed mortal life would merely be the state that came by Adam restored. Resumed mortal life was an exemplified phenomenon before Christ.

Paul is dealing with the subject in its broad contrasts, not with reference to details. "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," that is, "we all"; not all men absolutely, but the "all" of whom both states "in Adam" and "in Christ" can be predicated, namely, those who are in Christ. The state "in Christ" cannot be predicated of mankind in general. This limitation of the "all" is imposed by the very next verse: "But *every man* in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards *those who are Christ's* at his coming." It is not the rejected but the accepted. Those who are rejected are not "Christ's." He says to them "I never knew you." It is the accepted and the accepted only that are the subject of Paul's affirmations in this chapter. This is visible all through the chapter: "We shall *all* be changed...this mortal shall put on immortality"—that is, those who are finally saints. Paul has before his mind only those who are in Christ, and *only those who shall be accepted*. Will the rejected be changed? Will the rejected who certainly "have borne the image of the earthy," bear also the "image of the heavenly"? The answer is obvious.

Now if Paul in I Cor 15 have only before his mind the final effect of the work of Christ in the glorification of the accepted, as contrasted broadly with the work of Adam in bringing death, we must not apply his statements to ephemeral details which for the moment he was leaving out of sight. The judgment seat is an ephemeral detail—soon blotted out in the glory of the marriage supper of the Lamb. The reappearance of the unworthy from the grave is only an ephemeral detail. It is not to this he is referring when he says: "(We) all in Christ shall be *made alive*." By "made alive" he means brought entirely from death, quickened, *immortalised*, which though comprehending emergence from the grave, does not by any means consist wholly of that. To be the subject of a true "making alive," a man must be in Christ; but he does not require to be in Christ to merely resume mortal life for condemnation; for God condemns men, not because of their attempted conformity to Him, but because of refusal to submit to Him. His approbation is for thorough conformity, and therefore for those in Christ, than whom, none others conform to His will.

It is said that where sin is not taken away, there is no title to the resurrection that came through Christ. This is a scriptural truism, but does not help the argument against the rising of rejectors to punishment, for "the resurrection that came by Christ" was a resurrection *to die no more*, and to this resurrection certainly none will come forth but those whose sins are taken away. The wicked come forth to the resurrection of condemnation, as a mere resuscitation of their previous sinful selves. The power of unremitted sin is the one power needful for such a resurrection. "Those that do evil" is Christ's description of them; "the unjust" is Paul's, and in both cases the sin constituting them such has not been taken away, otherwise they would enter into life eternal. To associate the word "title" with the resurrection to condemnation is an extraordinary collocation of terms.

CHAPTER XXVIII—"GATHER MY SAINTS"

The writer naturally lays the utmost stress on the well-known words of Psa. 50, as proving the exclusion from the resurrection to condemnation of those who have not been baptised. "Gather my saints together unto me; those that have made a covenant with me by sacrifice" (verse 5).

There are two questions to consider with reference to the meaning of these words. First, do they refer to the judgment of the living and the dead at the appearing and kingdom of Christ? and, secondly, supposing they do, are they inconsistent with the presence on that occasion of those who have refused the sacrifice of Christ?

The answer to the first question is by no means free from doubt. It has been usual to understand the words in question as applying to the inspection of the household at the coming of Christ; but a consideration of the full scope of the Psalm suggests a different view. The first six verses by themselves apparently favour the ordinary application; but it may be legitimate to look beyond them, and not take them by themselves. They form but the prologue to the body of the Psalm. Now, the body of the Psalm is an expostulation with Israel after the flesh. Verse 7 opens the judgment ordered in the previous verses. "Hear O my people, and I will speak; O Israel, and I will *testify against thee*." The subject of the adverse testimony is the glut of animal sacrifices (8-13) and the dearth of that which would have given them acceptability: "thanksgiving," and the fulfillment of vows (verses 13-14). God assures them that a right compliance with His will in these matters would secure for them His friendship (verse 15). "But unto the wicked, God saith, what hast thou to do to declare my statutes, or that thou shouldst take my covenant in thy mouth." He then enumerates their offences, and calls upon them (verse 22) to "consider this, ye that forget God, lest I tear you in pieces." In this way God judges His people Israel with the judgment to which the opening of the Psalm calls attention. But can Israel be described as "those that have made a covenant with me by sacrifice"? There is no other people to whom that description is so naturally applicable. We read in Exodus 24 that *after sacrifices offered*, "Moses took the blood and sprinkled it on the people, and said, *Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words*." To them also the term "saints" (as holy ones) is more than once applied, e.g. Psa. 79:2; Deut 33:3. It may at first sight seem unnatural to understand the first six verses as the prelude to such an application of the Psalm. But they are paralleled in this respect in various other of God's messages by the prophets. The opening of Micah is a good example. Highly-wrought imagery is introduced as a preliminary to summoning the attention of disobedient Israel. "Hear all ye people; hearken, O earth and all that therein is, and let the Lord God be witness against you, the Lord from His holy

temple. For behold the Lord cometh forth out of His place, and will come down and tread upon the high places of the earth. And the mountains shall be molten under Him, and the valleys shall be cleft as wax before the fire, and as the waters that are poured down a steep place. For the transgression of Jacob is all this, etc."

If it should be thought that this is a change from former views, it has to be remarked that it is only a change as to the meaning of a particular Scripture, and not as to the doctrine taught in any part of Scripture. There is a great difference between seeing a passage in a new light and adopting a new doctrine. I have always supposed, in common with others, that Psalm 50, referred to the judgment of the household at the coming of Christ. I have done so because it seemed so, and because it has been the currently-accepted understanding of the Psalm from the beginning. But when it is made the stronghold of a doctrine in direct contradiction to the plain teaching of the scriptures, it challenges critical consideration with the result of showing that it must be interpreted as part of a complete discourse, and not construed with reference to its appearance as a mere fragment.

Finally, even supposing it had the meaning usually attached to it, it could not exclude from the judgment seat those who are otherwise declared to be related thereto. That those who have made a covenant by sacrifice will be there, does not prove that others will not be there. The meaning of the statement, even with the usual interpretation, relates to those who are mentioned, and not to those who are not mentioned. It does not follow because a thing or person or class is not mentioned in a statement concerning some other thing, person or class that they are therefore excluded. If I say that the successful students will be present at the prize distribution, I do not mean that nobody else will be there. If the Queen says, "Gather the lords unto me," she does not mean that they must come unattended by anyone else, but that *they* must be there. "Gather my saints unto me," certainly means that the saints will be gathered, but it does not mean that none else will be gathered for judgment. They are mentioned in particular because the judgment finally only concerns them. The saints are gathered to remain gathered; the others are not. The assembly of the others is not a gathering in the serious sense of what Paul describes as "our gathering together unto Him." Their presence is a mere incident of the situation—extraneous to the real process of developing "the general assembly and church of the first-born." The idea of the gathering centers in the accepted exclusively, to whom alone the words apply, "so shall we ever be with the Lord." The unfaithful will not "ever be with the Lord." For that reason, their participation in the gathering would be overlooked in a general description. The saints will be gathered, and they have made a covenant by sacrifice, and none will be included in their number who have not done so. Though sacrifice is not necessary for rejection, it is necessary for acceptance, and therefore "those who have made a covenant with me by sacrifice" is the characteristic description of the accepted. The rejected are the wicked; the wicked are not saints at the judgment seat, though included in the general description of the saints now.

To say that men are "summoned to judgment through blood-shedding" is to confuse our notions of judgment. Judgment is for those who are responsible to God, for good or evil, and has repeatedly in time past been inflicted on *nations outside of all covenant relation*. The ground of its infliction was that they were *worthy of punishment* by reason of their doings.

There are some grounds on which it might have been contended there could be no judgment for nations not related to God as Israel was. It is written in the prophet Amos concerning Israel, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore, I will punish you for all your iniquity." From this it might seem as if God would have no punishments for any other. But in the prophets are many cases of punishment for iniquity for nations whom God did not "know" as he knew Israel. In the very prophet Amos, in which we read "You only have I known" we read, "For three transgressions of DAMASCUS, and for four, I will not turn away from *the punishment thereof*." . . . "For three transgressions of GAZA, and for four, I will not turn away *the punishment thereof*. . . For three transgressions of TYRUS, and for four, I will nor turn away *the punishment thereof*."

All these were "families of the earth" whom God had not "known" as he had known Israel; yet there is punishment for them. We should, therefore, reason wrongly if we were to infer from the statement in Amos, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth, therefore I will punish you for all your iniquity," that God would not punish other nations. He expressly bars the way against this misinterpretation by sending Jeremiah to "*all the kingdoms of the world upon the face of the earth*" to say, "Lo, I began to bring evil on the city which is called by my name, and should ye be utterly unpunished? *Ye shall not be unpunished*, for I will call for a sword against all the inhabitants of the earth, saith the Lord of Hosts." Even the Canaanites, whom Israel succeeded in the land, were examples of punishment for iniquity. Moses told Israel (Deut. 9:4) that "for the wickedness of those nations, the Lord doth drive them out before thee—not for thy righteousness or the uprightness of thy heart." In Leviticus 18, you may read a description of the wicked ways of the Canaanites. Israel is commanded (verse 24-25), "Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things: for in all these things the nations are defiled which I cast out before you: and the land is defiled: therefore *I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it*." The flood and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrhah are lessons to the same point.

The statement, "You only have I known," is absolutely true both as to that fact and as to the special punishment growing out of it. It is the negative deduction from it that would be wrong. Israel has been punished as no other nation has because privileged as no other; but other nations are not unpunished. The principle regulating the dispensation of judgment is the simple and reasonable one affirmed by the Lord: "To whom much is given, of them shall much be required."

So with the subject in question, the work of God has taken an individual after a national form. The individual salvation offered to Israel in the preaching of John and Jesus, and rejected by them, has been offered to the Gentiles instead, and along with it a call to "all men everywhere to repent," and a "revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds. . . in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ" (Rom. 1: 17-18; 2:5-6,16). This operation develops a household of Christ, whose house men continue to be so long as they "hold fast the confidence and rejoicing of the hope steadfast unto the end." These have special privileges, and will have special accountability to answer for; but it is contrary to the whole tenor of divine revelation to say that because this is true, therefore the rebellious among men who "refuse him that speaketh," will have nothing to answer for in "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" if they should happen to be among the dead. It is a fallacy of the nature those would make, who should reason, that because God knew Israel only of all the families of the earth, therefore he would not punish the other families. It is not a mistake made by

those who have remained in harmony with Dr. Thomas from the beginning. These have always recognised that the truth creates responsibility wherever it understandingly comes, and that if men refuse the submission which God commands, they expose themselves to the terrors of the second death, naturally taking rank with the third class of the parable—additional to the faithful and unfaithful members of the household, whom the Lord describes as "those mine enemies who would not that I should reign over them."

How terrible it will be in that day, if through looseness of doctrine in this matter on our part, men should find themselves awake from the dead to judgment who did not expect to be there, and who would naturally turn their reproaches against us. "Why did you tell me I was not responsible?" Paul declared himself "free from the blood of all men," because he "had not shunned to declare the whole counsel of God." In this position we can scarcely consider ourselves if we lull people into a deadly indifference by teaching them that if they choose to disobey God, the worst they have to look for is to be left undisturbed in an everlasting grave. This is not the worst. There is a judgment which shall "devour the adversary" of which every (responsible) soul of man will partake who are "contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness" (Rom. 2:8). There is a class who, having no understanding, "shall not rise," but pass away as the beasts that perish; but to this class, those do not belong who, having come into contact with "the light that is come into the world," love darkness rather than light—and who, having heard the words of Christ as the acknowledged words of Christ and of God, have rejected them practically in refusing to walk in accord with them, will be 'judged by them in the last day.'

These are the solemn teachings of Christ and the apostles, which are not weakened by a right doctrine of "covenant-relationship." Covenant-relationship is rather an affair of benefit than of accountability. Outside the covenant, there can be no eternal life; but everything shows that men need not be inside that covenant to be the objects of God's righteous anger and punishment. We must not overlook the wide proprietorship of the Deity in all His works. If "the cattle upon a thousand hills" are His, much more the teeming millions of Adam's race. He is the "God of the spirits of all flesh," as Moses declared Him to be. "All souls are His," as he Himself said by Ezekiel, "the soul of the son and the soul also of the father." If He had not spoken to them, their being His would have done no more for them than it does for the beasts that perish; but He *has* spoken to them in their cast-off condition, and though few of them know the fact, or are in illuminated relation with the fact, it does not lessen the terrible import of the fact when they become aware of it, and cast it knowingly aside and live indifferently to it, as if man were his own maker and God's claims on him were nothing.

There is very little sense on the earth at present of what is due to God. An outrageous theology and a false science have, between them, so emasculated and confused all reasonable ideas on the subject that it is one of the last things recognized, "that God hath made all things for Himself, yea even the wicked for the day of His power." There is little sense of reverence for Him to be met with anywhere, and next to no recognition of His proprietorship in the things He has made. The earth and all things on it and related to it are treated as matters of human convenience merely, and almost regarded as of human manufacture. The world is sunk in a deadly stupefaction on this sublime subject. It needs waking up. It will get it shortly. It has had several wakings up in times past, but it has gone off again, and sleeps more soundly than ever. The new doctrine would confirm its deadly slumbers.

CHAPTER XXX—THE SECOND DEATH

The pamphlet makes the extraordinary suggestion that the second death is such by counting baptism as the first death. The object is to try and establish the contention of the paper, that those only who have been baptised can be the subjects of the second death. The effort is necessarily a total failure. Desiring to confine the second death in the artificial sense of his suggestion to the rejected candidates for life eternal, he has to deny that the devil and his angels are included in that second death, because having to admit that these are not a baptised community, he sees he must not admit them to an experience which he reserves only for the baptised. But the suggestion is in direct opposition to the facts of the case, which are these, Rev. 20:10: the devil was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet (*alias* the devil and his angels) were cast in on a previous occasion; and of this lake of fire, it says in verse 14, "THIS is the second death." It adds that "whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire"—that same lake into which the devil and his angels were cast, that same lake of fire, which is the second death. Then we are informed (chapter 21:8) that the fearful and the unbelieving, which the writer contends are those who have been atoned for, shall have their part in the lake of fire which burneth with fire and brimstone. Consequently the writer of the pamphlet is compelled to recognise that unbelievers in the general, represented by the devil, the beast, and the false prophet and believers, alike go into the second death. Now, if the second death mean a death which the baptised only can suffer, because baptism is, as alleged, the first death, how can unbaptised believers suffer it? Are not the devil and the false prophet unjustified sinners of the Gentiles who have never been baptised, and who, therefore, according to the writer's contention, have not suffered the first death?

The argument of the paper is opposed to common wisdom. The second death is God's second great retributive dispensation of death to mankind, the first originating with Adam in Eden, the second inflicted by the second Adam on those who are rebellious, at his coming. The writer says this would make Lazarus and others, who died a second time, the subjects of the second death. Nay, the second death defines a certain specific appointed judicial infliction of death, and not merely the exceptional recurrence of death in one or two cases not contemplated in the phrase. This is the sense of the phrase undoubtedly. Men die once, as it is written—"It is appointed unto men once to die," but to some it is appointed twice to die, because they are thought worthy of death a second time at the resurrection, whether they come within the range of atonement or not. When Lazarus died a second time, he did not die this death, and, therefore, not *the* second death, which is a dispensational event, and not a mere casual and incidental repetition of the process of natural dissolution.

The pamphlet gives too engrossing a position to our relation to Adam. Every man has a relation to Adam of course, but he has an individual life of his own with moral relations to his Creator, as shown by the whole course of God's dealings with the race since Adam was driven out of Eden. Death in Adam is one death, but if in God's estimation a man is considered deserving of death for his own sins, He will awake him to undergo it, for all Scripture teaching on the subject of the resurrection is that those who have done evil shall come forth to the resurrection of condemnation. "God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing whether it be good or whether it be evil." So Solomon plainly taught, many centuries before Jesus and Paul spake more plainly.

An analysis of the category of those who are liable to the second death in certain passages, does not get rid of the fact that it extends to others not mentioned in those passages, nor is the application of truth in the case to be deterred by the suggestion that such an extension of the second death would involve its application to the many millions living and dead at the coming of Christ. There is no numerical limitation to the application of the rule of responsibility. If the requisite enlightenment existed in past times to justify the resurrection of millions, they will undoubtedly be raised, but that enlightenment exists in but a comparatively few cases. Responsibility is co-existent with enlightenment only. God is reasonable and just; He will hold men responsible where sufficient enlightenment exists. We cannot say where this enlightenment exists as regards individual cases. It is impossible for us to draw the line of resurrectional responsibility in its individual application, but it is easy to apprehend the just and reasonable principle upon which it will be enforced.

CHAPTER XXXI—THE POINTS SUMMARISED

In the paper of which the pamphlet is the substance, there was set forth a summary of the truths said to be demonstrated. It is not necessary to follow this summary in detail, after having so entirely disposed of the so-called demonstration. The summary may, however, be usefully paraphrased in a sense opposed to its conclusions, thus:

1. That the law of sin and death keeps all who are not free from it in the perpetual bondage of corruption; but this bondage includes whatever prolongation or repetition of mortal life the justice of God may require, according to His discernments, and the revelation of His wrath against all unrighteousness.

2. That atonement by blood shedding has been devised by God for effecting deliverance from the law of sin and death in such a way as to bestow eternal life on those who are delivered, but the mere coming out of the grave as mortal men is not deliverance from the law of sin and death.

3. That for 4000 years atonement was typical, and therefore inefficacious until Christ died, when that which was typically foreshadowed became actual in him. Therefore there is no deliverance from death by typical atonement, except as opening the way for it by pleasing God, when the time should arrive for its effectuation.

4. That typical atonement of itself did not even postpone death, for all died: it but prophesied deliverance, and pleased God with those who conformed to His typical requirements.

5. That typical atonement was necessary to eternal life in the sense defined in proposition 3, but could not and did not remove Adamic death, which was accomplished only by Christ, and will be by him extended to all whom he approves at his coming.

6. That under the Mosaic law, none had access to the mercy seat without the typical atonement of sacrifice, which was a figure for the time then present that none could attain to eternal life except through the propitiation to be provided in Christ in a due future time. As for judgment, that does not require atonement of any kind to open the way for it. It is wickedness that brings judgment, and wickedness is imputed where there is a light of the knowledge of what God requires

7. That since the death of Christ, the baptism of believers has been the only atoning ceremony; that this ceremony connects believers with Christ in whom

the law of sin and death has been abolished, whose freedom they share as a matter of prospective heirship only at present, but which they will actually possess at the coming of Christ, if they walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.

8. That Christ through his own atonement has been raised from the dead, to die no more, and consequently none can rise to die no more except through the same means, but they may rise to mortal life without atonement, as shown by several historical cases of such resurrection, and by the testimony that God will bring to judgment every responsible soul of man that doeth evil whether he be Jew or Gentile.

9. That the atonement of Christ is not available for the resurrection to eternal life of any who have died in Adam only, that consequently all such must perish, whether they come forth to answer for responsible wickedness, or pass away without resurrection, like the beasts that perish.

10. That the summons to the judgment seat is confined to all who are responsible, whether freed from the law of sin and death or not. Christ is Lord both of the dead and of the living, and has received power over all flesh, to raise whomsoever he will.

11. That all who are rejected at the judgment seat will be consigned to the second death, and that all will undergo that death who are for whatever reason rejected, whether dead or alive at the coming of Christ.

The paper remarks that God's appointments partake of the unchangeableness of His character. This is not to speak accurately. The law of the Medes and Persians could not be altered, but it is not so with the law of God. He gave the law of Moses, and He took it away, not capriciously, still, as a fact. "He *taketh away* the first," says Paul, "that He may establish the second." Granted, certainly, that He does not set aside His laws and then revert to them from fickleness or caprice, but *not* granted that He ties His hands in such a way as to interfere with the execution of anything justice may call for.

The Edenic sentence is no barrier to further punishment, though it is a barrier to life eternal if unremoved. The whole history of God's dealings with man since Eden is an illustration of the fact that He is angry with the wickedness of man, and punishes him for it in various ways. One of the ways, and one of the sorest ways, is to break their mortal slumbers and bring them forth to face Christ as judge, and suffer the shame and agony of that crowd that will depart from his presence with weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth, to the second death.

CHAPTER XXXII—OBJECTIONS

There is some show of disposing of the objections which have been raised against the new doctrine. That the effort is a failure must be evident to every one who can distinguish between words and arguments.

THE HISTORIC CASES OF RESURRECTION—Consider the attempt to reconcile the resurrection of unjustified persons in past times with the contention that unjustified persons cannot possibly rise when Christ comes. Restoration to life in such past cases is said to have "merely suspended the operation" without terminating "the death imposed for Adam's offence." If this is a reasonable distinction, why

should it be inapplicable to the unjust who come forth to the resurrection of condemnation? If a mere suspension of the operation of Adamic death allows of the raising of an unjustified man to show the power of God in miracle, would not the "mere suspension" be all that would be necessary to allow of the raising of an unjustified rebel to receive the "due reward of his deeds." No, says the pamphlet: "God has decreed that death must follow sin, and that such death can only be terminated or averted by justification from the sin which caused it." Very well, if God has decreed this, then the death of unjustified sinners cannot be "terminated" by "mere suspension;" "it can only be terminated by justification from the sin that caused it." And yet it was terminated in the historic cases without such justification; and having to admit this, the pamphlet tries to get out of it by calling the absence of justification a "mere suspension." What are we to call this? It is what scholars call "mere logomachy." Mere words, used flexibly and adroitly, but not with reference to the true demands of reason; principles of truth put into the fire of polemic heat, and forged on the anvil into any shape that the artificer may find convenient.

Of a similar character is the statement that "the *endless* subjection to death (in the sense, that is, of not allowing of a moment's respite from the coffin, however heinous their crimes against heaven), is essential to the fulfilment of the law of sin and death," and yet the writer is obliged to admit, notwithstanding, that the law of sin and death was fulfilled in the case of those who were raised in past times and went to their graves again, though the "endlessness" contended for as "essential" was interrupted in their case. "The men brought to life by Elijah and Elisha were not thereby released from condemnation in Adam, and Adamic death in their case did not come to an end." This might be a very good answer as against those who contend that men brought to life by Christ at his coming must first be released from condemnation in Adam. We never knew of anyone maintaining such a contention, except such as take the position of the writer of this pamphlet. It is therefore an answer against himself; for if Elijah and Elisha could bring men to life without their first having been released from condemnation in Adam, Christ can do the same thing. If Elijah and Elisha could do it to show the power of God, Christ can do it to administer the justice of God.

The "historic cases" are not disposed of at all by mere disclaimer. They remain an invincible barrier to the contention that the Adamic sentence is an obstacle in the way of the resurrection of unjustified men. Here are persons actually coming to life again, who had the hereditary sentence on them, and from whom it had never been removed. To say that they rose with reference to others and not with reference to themselves does not dispose of the case. If people with the sentence of death on them can rise "in reference to others," they certainly CAN rise in reference to themselves if the reason is sufficient. If said persons could rise without any necessity of judgment requiring it, they certainly could rise much more easily if the righteous judgment of God called for it—if "their individual offences" made it just that they should suffer punishment. If they could be raised independently of the operation of "law, covenant or promise," there is certainly no scriptural difficulty in the way of their resurrection where "law, covenant and promise" have come nigh in commanded submission which they have rebelliously refused.

It does not get rid of the fact of their resurrection to say it was a mere act of power. It was an act of power performed under the circumstances in which this argument says *such an act is impossible*. If such an act of power could be performed for any reason, there is certainly nothing in the way of its performance to bring the guilty to justice "in the day of wrath and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God...when God shall judge the secrets by Christ Jesus,"

and "bring to light the hidden things of darkness" (Rom. 2:6; I Cor. 4:5). It is all a question of whether the persons affected are "worthy of punishment"—of which Christ is the sole judge.

The writer says that "those who die in Adam were judged and condemned in Adam in the garden of Eden!" If there is any truth in such an assertion, he ought not to maintain, as he does further on, that God judges the wicked in this life. If they were "judged in Adam," why are they judged again in this life? And if they can be judged again in this life, notwithstanding their having been "judged in Adam," what obstacle is there in the way of their being judged by Christ, to whom has been assigned this particular function and power "over all flesh" of ministering the wrath of God at His coming to those whom He may consider "worthy of it," who are "contentious and do not obey the truth but obey unrighteousness," and "who knowing the judgment of God that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same but have pleasure in them that do them?" (Rom. 2:8; 1:32).

We cannot admit that the cases of resurrection that have occurred apart from atonement are departures from law. There is no law against them. They were no more infractions of law than the healing of disease, of which indeed they were but the extremest form. They were within the prerogative of God, whose hands cannot be tied, except by His faithfulness. He cannot be unfaithful. What He promises He will perform. And what He says He will not do, will never be done. But where there is no purpose or declaration to a contrary effect, He cannot be tied as men are tied—by what becomes a legal quibble when words are made to violate principles. He sentenced Adam to death, but He did not say He would under no circumstances permit the temporary revival of life. In the historic cases of resurrection, He therefore did not go against His word. Some friends seem to argue as if He had done so, or at least that He would do so if in the case of the wicked at the resurrection He allowed the temporary restoration of life for a much better reason.

If it had been a case of immortalising sinners, there might have been ground for the contention that there had been a departure from law. But as the mere allowing of mortal men to live mortally a little longer, it was no infraction of law but a performance within law. And it will be no infraction of law to bring mortal men from the grave to answer mortally for "all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches which they have spoken against Him."

It is true there can only be resurrection to eternal life through Christ, but it is not true that there can be no return to mortal life without an obedient connection with him, as is absolutely proved by the cases in question. It is the giving too narrow a scope to the words "resurrection through Christ" that creates the difficulty that some have experienced. Understanding them to mean the restoration of mortal life, many difficulties are created. Resurrection through Christ is synonymous with salvation through Christ. It is a mistake to apply the truth involved in this doctrine to the doctrine of condemnation. Men cannot be saved without Christ, but they may and will be condemned without him if they knowingly reject him.

REJECTORS—It is admitted by the pamphlet that the rejectors of Christ, referred to in John 3:18,19, and 12:47,48, will rise from the dead and be condemned at the judgment seat of Christ. Hereupon a strange contradiction arises. It is a postulate with the writer that men must be "justified from the law of sin and

and death," that is, must be redeemed from the Adamic sentence, before they can rise from the dead. Here are rejectors of Christ who are to rise. Now, one of two things must be true if the pamphlet's theory of the case is correct. Either men can be redeemed from the law of sin and death without Christ, or men can rise from the dead without being redeemed from the law of sin and death. Which is it? Will the writer of the pamphlet contend that the blood of bulls and goats can take away sin, in the face of Paul's declaration to the contrary? (Heb. 10:4). Will he contend that a law was given which could give life, notwithstanding the explicit declaration that the law "could not" do it? (Rom. 8:3; Gal. 3:21). He will doubtless disclaim any such contention. He will doubtless say, as he says of animal sacrifice on page 8 of the pamphlet, "To be of ANY SERVICE in the abolition of death, *it required to be supplemented by sacrifice of a higher order,*" that is, by the sacrifice of Christ. If this be so, how was animal sacrifice to be "supplemented" in the case of those who "rejected" the sacrifice of Christ? There is absolutely no escape here. Therefore, the only alternative remaining to the writer is the one which he writes this pamphlet to repudiate: "that men can rise from the dead—to the resurrection of condemnation—without being redeemed from the law of sin and death."

LIGHT AS THE RULE OF RESPONSIBILITY—There is a similarly vain attempt on the part of the writer to get rid of the declaration of Christ that "this is the (ground of) condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light." He says the "light" is Christ, and that the rule in the case applied only to "the generation of Jews then living." Does he mean to say there was no condemnation in the world before Christ came? No condemnation for the Jews that lived before? None of those who have lived since? Why, the whole burden of the pamphlet is to prove that condemnation rested upon all. "Ah, that was the Adamic condemnation." Yes, but prospective resurrectional condemnation as well, for those who, in the language of page 22, "made a covenant with God by sacrifice," and "did not fulfil its terms to the end of their life." The question is asked, "In such cases, was their retribution confined to the curse of the law?" The question is answered, "No; they must suffer the retribution due for unfaithfulness to the Abrahamic covenant." That this is intended to mean resurrectional condemnation is made certain by the next question and answer (of which the author is too fond).

Now, if condemnation existed before the days of Christ, how are we to understand the construction of his words that would make him say that condemnation was owing to his having come? and was limited to those who happened to live in the same age of the world? Such an interpretation renders his words unintelligible. He expressly bars the way to such an understanding of them. He says, in the very same chapter, "God sent not His Son to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved" (verse 17). It is evident that some other understanding of them must be brought to bear to harmonise them with all the facts. It is true he is the light of the world, and that he declared himself to be such, but it does not follow that he always means himself when he uses the word light; he uses the word in the abstract sense frequently, and that he is using it in this sense here is proved by the immediate context: "Everyone that doeth evil hateth the light (not hateth Christ); neither cometh to the light lest his deeds should be reprov'd." There can be no question here about his speaking of light in the general sense, and not in the figurative sense of his own person. It is therefore certain that this is the sense of his words in the sentence immediately before "This is the condemnation that light is come." And this is a reasonable sense, and applies to the whole operations of light at all times and everywhere. Times of ignorance (that is, of darkness) God winks at; times of knowledge, He

does not wink at, but holds men accountable for their privileges, in accordance with the reasonable principle that "to whom much is given, of them will much be required." Any other view is absurd and demoralising.

"He that BELIEVETH NOT." There is the same violation of consistency and the same violence to fact in the endeavour to get rid of the applicability to knowing rejectors, of the words of Christ, "He that believeth not *shall be damned.*" It is admitted that these words mean resurrection to condemnation. The attempted escape is on the question of their application. The suggestion is they applied only to the Jews. But how could they apply to even the Jews if the writer's contention is right, that men cannot rise without being redeemed from "Adamic death," and cannot be redeemed from Adamic death unless the "shadow justification" of sacrifice has the sacrifice of Christ retrospectively applied by the faith of the believing offerer? The Jews who "believed not" did not have what is called their "typical atonement" "ratified"—to use the writer's expression; and therefore it was of no redeeming power, unless the writer contend, as he does not contend, that those sacrifices had redeeming power apart from Christ.

But did the words apply only to the Jews? The suggestion is inconsistent with the evidence. "Go ye unto all the world." Ah, but what world? exclaims the writer. And he answers, after various inconclusive references, "The Jewish nation only." This is confuted by the parallel passage in Matt. 28:19, "Go ye, therefore, and teach ALL NATIONS." "All nations" and "all the world" are used here synonymously, which is agreeable to the language he addressed to the apostles before leaving them, "Ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea and in Samaria, and unto the UTTERMOST PARTS OF THE EARTH."

But, says the writer, the apostles understood the words with a Jewish limitation. That is true, but does not interfere with the fact that Jesus had a knowledge of the coming extension of the gospel to the whole habitable, which he adumbrated in various other sayings (John 10:16; Matt. 8:10-11; 22:1-13). With this previous knowledge, he gave to the wording of his commission to the apostles a form that covered the whole scope of their subsequent operations. "He that believeth not shall be condemned" cannot therefore be limited in the way required by the argument of the pamphlet. The gospel preached to the Jews was afterwards transferred to Gentiles (Acts 13:46-47; 28:28), with the express intimation that there was no difference between them as regards their sinfulness and the dispensation of divine judgment (Rom. 3:9; 2:9; Acts 15:7-9). The Jews were not justified either by their circumcision or their sacrifices or their laws. Circumcision became uncircumcision by their other disobediences (Rom. 2:25), their sacrifices were vain worship (Isa. 1:11-15), and the law was administration of death (2 Cor. 3:7). Therefore, they were in no better a position than the Gentiles. They were under condemnation one and all (Rom. 3:9). If, then, Jews in this position were liable (as admitted) to resurrection for punishment for refusing the demands of Christ in the gospel, it is impossible to understand on what principle disobedient Gentiles, whom God approaches in the same gospel, are to be held ineligible. To say it is because they refuse to be baptised, is to stultify reason, understanding and testimony.

In Acts 13:40 we read that Paul said to the Jews, "*Beware* lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the prophets, Behold ye despisers, and wonder and perish, etc." Here is warning involving the judgment seat of Christ for disobedient Israel. Now, two verses further down (verse 42) we read that "when the Jews were gone out of the synagogue, the Gentiles *besought that these words might be preached* TO THEM the next sabbath." The apostles complied: and when the Jews

opposed, "Paul and Barnabas waxed bold and said, it was necessary that the word of God should FIRST *have been preached unto you*, but seeing ye put it from you and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, *we turn to the Gentiles*." Thus, the same word of God that had been preached to the Jews was transferred to the Gentiles. If, then, the judgment seat of Christ was involved in the word preached to the Jews, as admitted, it necessarily was involved in the word preached to the Gentiles, for it was the same word that was preached to one and the other. Between Jews and Gentile, in this matter, there is no difference. Such is the explicit declaration of the Apostles (Rom. 3:22-23; Acts 15:7-9).

The whole ground is covered by the declaration of Paul as to the scope and bearing of the Gospel. "Therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith...for the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against *all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men* who hold the truth in unrighteousness," Jew or Gentile, for there is no respect of persons with God, as he says repeatedly in chapter 2: (9-11). The wrath in question he connects with the day of the bestowal of immortality, which he speaks of as "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God who will render to every man according to his deeds" (2:5-7), also as "the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Christ Jesus" (verse 16). It is consequently beside the mark to lay stress on the absence of "threat or penalty" from the promulgated command in Paul's day to all men everywhere.

GOD'S COMMAND TO ALL MEN—There is a prolonged effort to get rid of the resurrectional bearing of the summons by the Gospel to "all men everywhere" to repent (Acts 17:30). It is necessarily a failure, notwithstanding a vast amount of the ingenuity characteristic of the pamphlet throughout. Its initial flaw consists of ignoring the implication arising from Paul's introductory allusion to "times of ignorance." "The times of this (past) ignorance, God *winked at*, BUT NOW commandeth all men," etc. Here is a contrast in the Divine attitude in two different sets of circumstances: "winking at" times of ignorance,—not winking at times of an opposite sort—times of knowledge when as John said "the true light now shineth." Now, why should this distinction be made if the doctrine of this pamphlet is true, that ignorance or knowledge makes no difference to the position of men in relation to Divine judgment, so long as they keep outside the operation of "the blood of the everlasting covenant"? There *is* a difference. God winks at the wanderings of men in times of ignorance; He does not in time of knowledge. This being declared, how are we to understand the winking at times of ignorance? Does it mean holding men unaccountable as concerns the conditions of this life? This cannot be, because there is no relaxation of the penalties of sin so far as this life is concerned. The punishments imprecated on Babylon, on Assyria, on Egypt, on Damascus, on Moab, Edom, etc., and the afflicted experience of mankind in general abundantly prove this. In what other direction can accountability be relaxed? In the direction of resurrectional accountability, which both Old and New Testaments announce as a prospective contingency. Now, if the winking at times of ignorance means that God did not under circumstances of ignorance hold men amenable to resurrectional responsibility, what can the altered procedure mean but that light having come, that same responsibility comes with it where the light is operative? No, says the pamphlet writer: it only means that He will pour judgments upon them in this life. This cannot be the meaning, because God has always "poured judgments upon them in this life." His winking at their ignorance did not exclude these: yet it did exclude something which was no longer to be excluded; and what this something is Paul intimates. "God hath appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom He hath ordained." Though this covers "ruling," it embraces every judgment which the ordained man will exercise, and "judging the secrets of men" is one of

them, as Paul defines, and Peter also in saying: "It is he whom God hath ordained to be the *judge of the living and the dead*." But, objects the writer, this would be to punish the unjustified twice—punish them in this life, and punish them at the resurrection. Why should this be urged as an objection. The pamphlet writer rejoins: "It would not be in harmony with the divine *procedure* in the past" (he fights shy of the word "justice"). We are wondering what "procedure." The procedure open to test would be the case of those who are without controversy to rise to the resurrection of condemnation—the Jewish rejectors of Christ. Were they not punished at the destruction of Jerusalem? Undoubtedly. The high priest who condemned Christ is specially mentioned in the narrative of Josephus. He was punished in this life, and will rise to that other sorer punishment "reserved for the ungodly in the day of judgment." Therefore, the twice punishing of the unjustified would not be "contrary to divine procedure in the past." "Well, it would involve the resurrection of the whole world." No, not unless the whole world were enlightened by the knowledge of the truth. "Alienated from the life of God, through the IGNORANCE that is in them," is the characteristic state of the earth—which the darkness "covers." "He hath given the earth into the hands of the wicked" (Job), and "to the wicked there is no peace." This is "the meaning of the exhibitions of His anger portrayed in the seven seals, the seven trumpets and the seven vials." But it does not exclude the sorer punishment of resurrectional dispensation where there is sufficient knowledge to warrant it.

JUSTICE—Though justice is scouted in this pamphlet as the regulating principle of the divine procedure, it remains the animating principle of His judgment of mankind. This must in the nature of things be the case. "A just God and a Saviour" is His own description of Himself (Isaiah 14:21). "Just and right is He" is the declaration of the Memorial Song (Deut. 32:4). "The just Lord" is His name in Zeph. 3:5. "He will not do iniquity." "Justice and judgment are the habitation of His throne" (Psalm 39:14). We may not always be able to see the justice, but we may be quite sure it exists—justice (what is owing from God to man) as God reckons. The toleration of the wicked for a time, which the pamphlet raises as an objection to the justice argument, is certainly no denial of justice, if justice be finally carried out. It is only in the nature of what Solomon refers to, when he says, "Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, the heart of the sons of men is fully yet in them to do evil. Though a sinner do evil a hundred times and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, but it shall not be well with the wicked" (Ecc. 8:11-12). "The spreading of the wicked like a green bay tree" is not inconsistent with justice; it is merely the giving of wickedness its opportunity to be wickedness. We must not confound long-suffering with the abandonment of justice. Peter puts the matter in its right light, when he says of the Papistical sinners who were to arise and prosper for a time, "Whose judgment now of a long time *lingereth not* and their damnation *slumbereth not*: for if God spared not the angels that sinned...these shall receive the reward of unrighteousness."

As to the punishment of the last generation of Papists, there is in the divine programme a mixing of previous generations with them which quite excludes the argument attempted to be founded on them. This is evident from the words, "Thy wrath is come *and the time of the dead*, that they should be judged." The casting of the gathered grapes of earth's ripe wickedness into the "great winepress of the wrath of God" includes this element—to what extent, we cannot foreknow except as regards the application of the principles of responsibility. The "synagogue of Satan"—that is, the rival ecclesias in John's day, "who said they were Jews and *were not*," will be there, to be witnesses of the exaltation of those whom Christ

loved, but whom they despised and opposed in the day of probation (Rev. 3:9). The destroyers of the Lord Jesus and the rejectors of his words will be there (Matt. 26:64; John 12:48; Luke 13:25,29) who, though overwhelmed in the perdition of Jerusalem, will rise also in the resurrection to the greater shame that awaits those who despised God at that time, as these testimonies prove. The apostles and prophets will be there to witness the vengeance (Rev. 18:20); and who can reasonably maintain since the destroyers of the Head will be personally there, resuscitated from the dead, that the destroyers of his body will not also be there, in view of his declaration: "he that despiseth you, despiseth me": and "he that offendeth against one of my little ones, it were better for him to be drowned in the midst of the sea." And if the responsible destroyers of the Lord, and his apostles' destroyers, will be there to receive the due reward of their deeds, why not the responsible destroyers of His people in all generations since? It is "the time of the dead, that they should be judged."

To say that previous generations will not suffer is to contradict the testimony. The nature of the awful times that are ahead involves this most terrible of all ingredients, that sinners of past ages come forth to a judgment they did not receive in their lifetime. It is a new and extraordinary and altogether unscriptural principle to lay down, that those who submit to God now to the extent of putting on the name of Christ will be "treated according to the strictest justice," while the ungodly, who rebelliously put God far from them, and cast dishonour on His manifested kindness and authority in the gospel, are "not dealt with on the basis of justice."

The view which this pamphlet seeks to overturn is the only view that gives a reasonable meaning to the fact that Paul had "the terror" of the judgment-seat before his mind in "persuading men," as he says in 2 Cor. 5:11, and that Felix trembled under his preaching (Acts 24:25). The meaning suggested by the pamphlet is not reasonable. It thinks it was the destruction of Jerusalem that Paul spoke of. Even if that were really what Paul talked about, it would not exhaust the judgment in its individual bearing; for many who perished in that awful calamity will awake to "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" at His coming (Rom 2:16). Christ expressly teaches this concerning his rejectors and destroyers—most of whom were alive at the destruction of the Jewish nation. God said He would punish Israel "seven times for their sins" (Lev. 26). In this life men are punished many times. The punishment reserved for the appearing of Christ is the climax. It is not superseded by anything that may happen now. If, therefore, Felix had Jerusalem's perdition exhibited to him, the general tenor of Paul's writings would lead us to expect that he spoke also of the much more terrible "judgment to come" belonging to "the time of the dead that they should be judged"—at which it is much more likely he would tremble, than at an event which there was a possibility he would escape, and a probability that he did escape.

THE TERROR OF THE LORD—As to "the terror of the Lord," it is said that "it has reference to those in Christ," and that the persuading of men of which Paul speaks has reference to the brethren of Christ: that the word "men" is identical with "your" at the close of the verse (2 Cor. 5:11). This endeavour to divert the "persuading" enterprise of the Apostles from its bearing on the world, to whom it was expressly directed in the first instance ("Go ye into all the world," etc.) (nations), and to confine it to "the brethren of Christ" is in conflict with the structure and context of the verse, and with the practice of the Apostles as recorded. While the word "men" might, in the abstract, be applied to brethren when no other men are in question, the application is excluded when it occurs in a category in which the brethren are separately addressed. This is the case with 2 Cor. 5:11. There is a category of four parties to the "terror" under discourse,

1. God;
2. Paul;
3. men;
4. you.

He had referred to the judgment-seat as involving the element of "terror." This terror, he says, is one of the considerations impelling him in his enterprise towards "men." His object in this enterprise was misunderstood by men, but was manifest to God, and "I trust also we are made manifest in *your* consciences" (that is, discerned and understood by you). It cannot be that "men" and "you" are identical in such a collocation of terms. The "you" referred to those to whom he was writing—the brethren in Corinth: the "men" to those towards whom his apostolic work was directed—that is, men in general.

As a matter of fact, Paul's enterprise had to do broadly with all men. The nature of his work involved it. The record of his work shows it. "We preach unto you," says he to the people of Lystra (Acts 14:15), "that ye should turn from these vanities unto the living God." Here was a "persuading of men," which is directly connected with the prospect of judgment in his speech to the people of Athens. "The times of this (past) ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth *all men everywhere* to repent, because He hath appointed," etc. "The object of apostolic persuading" was of a much wider scope than the argument of the pamphlet allows for. "To induce the brethren of Christ to live not unto themselves" was an element in it, but was far from being the whole of it. "A testimony against them," is Christ's own description of one bearing of the apostolic message on the enlightened rejector. That a work of God's favour towards men should carry with it responsibility to judgment is in harmony with the universal principle of divine action as illustrated in all the scriptures. Nothing but mischief can come from the denial of it. Even the plea of some—that men should be drawn by love and not coerced by fear—is abandoned in the admission of "the terror of the Lord" as a constraining motive, though strangely enough the reserving it all for the Lord's brethren and leaving none for the Lord's enemies—of whom the Lord himself has said, by parable, that in the day of his coming, he will issue the command, "Bring them hither and slay them before me."

CHAPTER XXXIII—THE EXTENT OF RESURRECTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

How far responsibility extends is not a practicable question. We do not and cannot know. It goes with the light; Jesus says so; but no man can say where sufficient light exists to make responsibility reasonable. The extensive circulation of the Scriptures does not secure an extensive diffusion of light. The millions know in a hazy way that immorality is unrighteous; but their state is more or less that state of darkness which the Spirit of God declares in David brings a man to the level of the beasts that perish. We know that Jesus says, "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin" (that is, to answer for, as he afterwards explained); and we know that blindness is not only Israel's state but that of the Gentiles also—on land and sea. The question relates to those who are not blind, but who know of God's message to the Gentiles by the hands of Paul, and for their own pleasure refuse to submit to it. The obligation of men to obey God does not depend upon their consent, but arises from the command delivered to all men to repent. They are bound to obey. If they obey, their obedience will be rewarded, for so God has condescended to promise. If they disobey, there is "a fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation." Passages, therefore, that prove (as admitted) that the unjustified "Jews addressed by Christ will be raised to judgment," because of their refusal to submit to his word, prove that the same rule will hold good with regard to all alienated Gentiles to whom that word knowingly comes by divine authority: for "there is no respect of persons with God" in this very matter of judgment (Rom. 2:11).

So with regard to passages addressed to "baptised believers." Statements addressed to them may, and often do, refer to others than they. When it is said that God

is "the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe," there is a reference to other than "baptised believers." When it is said "God judgeth them that are without," there is a reference to other than baptised believers. So, when it is said in Rom. 2:8-16, that God will render to them that are contentious and *do not obey the truth*, but unrighteousness, indignation, and wrath..."in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men," the reference is not to those who do obey the truth in baptism or otherwise. When Paul says that "Jesus Christ shall judge the living and the dead at his appearing," it means all who are responsible, of course, and therefore refers to other than baptised believers, seeing that other than baptised believers are responsible as the paragraph admits, to wit, "the Jews addressed by Christ (in John 12:48), who were not baptised believers.

It is plainly declared that "God judgeth them that are without." This judgment receives in one case a distinctly future application, as when Paul enquires (Rom. 3:5,6), "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? (I speak as a man). God forbid, for then how SHALL God judge the world?" But even if the passage in question were only "predictions of Divine judgments *in this life*," as contended—they would have a bearing on the question of resurrection-judgment, in so far as they would prove that it is not necessary for men to be in Christ to be the subjects of Divine judgment. If this is not necessary for one form of judgment, there is no principle on which it can be held to be necessary for any form of judgment, for the principle of judgment is the same in all cases, namely, *punishment deserved by reason of wilful rebellion*. If men hear of God's purpose in Christ, and become aware of His summons to submit to His requirements in Him, and refuse for their own pleasure or convenience to have anything to do with God, the ground of judgment exists. They are "worthy" of the sorer punishment arising out of the greater privilege of enlightenment. The rule is "to whom much is given, of him shall much be required."

If, as contended, the judgment seat had reference only to "a probation for eternal life," its operation upon the rejected would be complete by the simple withholding of eternal life, whereas it deals out punishment to "those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness." It renders "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish to every (accountable) soul of man that doeth evil" (Rom. 2:8,9). The judgment seat really has its origin in the authority of God over all flesh, which authority all flesh has set aside and thereby incurred the divine displeasure—the manifestation of which is regulated by justice according to circumstances (John 9:41). A probation for eternal life is but a detail in the greater fact of God's creation of and ownership in man.

CHAPTER XXXIV—THE TEACHING OF DR. THOMAS

Reference to Dr. Thomas is reasonable. He was the instrument through whom divine truth has been in our day recovered from the Papistical and Protestant obscurations of ages. He was not infallible, and on doubtful questions of interpretation in detail there might here and there be room for divergence of judgment. But as regards the solid foundations and leading outlines of divine truth, his power of seeing the whole of a subject and logically construing its scattered elements was so great that it is impossible not to attach the greatest weight to his judgment when we are invited to accept a conclusion inconsistent with that judgment of the ungodly which he regarded as a principle regulating the divine attitude towards mankind. While this is not in the abstract a conclusive argument, it is of some weight in a question which depends, for its right decision, upon the construction of widely-scattered and nebulous premises; and of overwhelming weight when it is perceived that the entire evidence is in harmony with Dr. Thomas' judgment, and

the rival view in harmony only with a part of that evidence and in violent collision with many features of divine wisdom. The writer of the pamphlet is precluded from using in a sense favourable to his contention anything that Dr. Thomas has written on the subject, seeing that Dr. Thomas' main conclusion is inconsistent with the conclusion which the writer of the pamphlet regards as the truth. He may say that Dr. Thomas' view is "at variance with the scriptural principles which Dr. Thomas enunciates." This is only another way of saying that Dr. Thomas and the writer of the pamphlet differently construe the same premises; and a mode of inviting the reader to accept the pamphlet-writer's construction in preference to Dr. Thomas. I for one must decline; and I submit that I have in this review shown good reason for doing so.

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